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Published at
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Essays accepted for publication will appear at the earliest feasible time.

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Two issues—$8
Retired persons and students — $4 per year
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THE TEMPEST CALMED
by Walter D. Haden

Fantastic as the glass old Proteus keeps shaking,
The storm is passing, but the ship hangs wracked
Upon the question yet of death.
Refrafterd through the silver salt of ocean's opaque mirror,
These pearls that once were eyes glow through Prospero's
lucent masque;
Jaded, a middle-aged creator peoples the void with purpose,
Regenerating old bones, gathering love back from the seaweed's
grasp.
Fantasy? Yes, yet real as the Ariel mind,
Miranda's faith and earth-caught appetites of the shallow
Caliban,
Creator, trifling with such mortal toys,
Learns worse, and better, than his quiescence might have
guessed.
The tempest calmed and twilight sea turned opalescent,
The wizard ends our revels, all—frees, forgives us,
Each to suffer his own sea-change into something strange and
rich.
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THE GOOD COUNSELOR IN SHAKESPEARE’S PLAYS
by Roy Battenhouse

To embark on the topic of the good counselor in Shakespeare’s plays is to face immediate complexities. A few questions will illustrate. Is a good counselor simply one who warns against vice? If so, Iago is a good counselor when warning Othello against jealousy the green-eyed monster. Othello thinks Iago a good counselor, but it’s clear to us that Iago is double-tongued, inciting the jealousy he verbally disparages. Or take a second case: Does the sincere preaching of moral truisms guarantee good counsel in the speaker? Friar Laurence is obviously sincere when he tells Romeo that doting is not true love, and that rude will is the foe of grace, and that one should go “Wisely and slow. They stumble that run fast.” But we see Laurence, even while he says this, hasting to propose a clandestine marriage and stumbling not long afterwards into proposing a potion to evade confessing the truth. Contradictions between the Friar’s adages and his impromptu remedies spell tragedy, and we may recall a shrewd remark by Portia in The Merchant of Venice: “It is a good divine that follows his own instruction.”

In Julius Caesar, still another kind of question arises: Is Cassius a good counselor when he advises Brutus to dispose of Antony along with Caesar, or (when that advice was overridden) or least to refuse Antony an opportunity to speak? Each of those counselings was wise if the conspiracy was to succeed. Brutus, by rejecting such advice, fastened his own ruin. But this case raises the question of just how “good” any tactical counsel can be when the cause it serves is ruined morally by the selfish ambition of the whole enterprise. Shakespeare incites us to deepen our apprehension of what constitutes good counsel.

The tragedies present many instances of a counselling that is seemingly good but actually defective. Consider, for example, the advice Menenius gives Coriolanus in the trial scene. He keeps urging the hero to be mild and calm and humbly tactful; meanwhile, the play is showing us the inadequacy of any merely gestural amiability. What Coriolanus tragically lacks is a genuine love for the people, and Menenius is at heart as much a scorner
of the plebs as is the hero and his mother. The genuineness of the mother's love for her son is questionable in all her counselling. In the embassy scene she urges a duty to mother and to country which wins for her Rome's plaudits but involves her son in inevitable destruction. The blindness of shallow although "patrician" moral ideals is abundantly evident in this play, and with it a challenge to the reader to "try the spirit" of all counselors who preach honor, valor, patriotism, and filial duty. The everyday problem of distinguishing good counsel from bad is often made difficult by the fashions of a particular cultural milieu. Fashion (if we may recall a theme in the comedy Much Ado About Nothing) is a "thief Deformed"; and if so, all of us need to be aware that mere code-fashioned judgments on the part of counselors who pose as "good," or even by those who "sincerely" think of themselves as friendly helpers, are liable to a counterfeiting of the good—a counterfeiting which fashion encourages when self-knowledge is either lacking or evaded.

What are readers of Hamlet to think, for instance, of the counsel the Ghost gives his son? If they judge as the son himself does, the command to "remember me" and to "Revenge" is that of an honest Ghost whose counsel warrants obedience (even though Hamlet himself has qualms, later, that it may be of the devil). But how "honest" is a Ghost who admonished "Taint not thy mind" when, as his whole message indicates, his own mind is tainted by a scorn of Claudius as mere "garbage" in comparison to his own "radiant angel" dignity? What the son is asked to remember is the horror of indignities done to a godlike father—and not, as Malcolm counsels Macduff in Macbeth, to make "medicines" to cure deadly grief through a public military action sanctioned by "powers above." The Ghost's counsel awakens in Hamlet only a swirl of loathing, wild actions and whirling words, and a commitment to a secret and antic revenge which ends in the ruin of the whole house of Denmark. Since the Ghost's code of values turns morbidly about a revenging of dishonor, we can call his counsel good only if we ourselves suppose that the vindication of a Renaissance gentleman's ideal of honor is life's chief good, or Denmark's chief good. This supposition the tragedy invites us to question.

In other plays even the counselling of a bishop can be
questionable. Is Carlisle in Richard II a "good" counsellor when he prophesies, in God's name, that Bolingbroke's crowning will bring England only bloodshed and a land of dead men's skulls? This warning proves true enough in the era that followed. But has the Bishop himself done anything to mend the situation? Earlier, in Act III, he counselled the despairing Richard that Heaven's "means" must be embraced and not neglected. This sounds like good advice. Yet what specific means did Carlisle then propose? Only that of military counteraction, with no suggestion that repentance and amendment of life is a means heaven offers. Wise men do not wail, Carlisle urged, but rather they "fight and die." Are we to suppose Shakespeare thought such counsel adequate? Carlisle's protest at Westminster has aspects of blind question-begging:

What subject can give sentence on his king?
And who sits here that is not Richard's subject?

One answer to these political queries would be for the Bishop to remember whom he was ordained to be subject to as his primary obligation—not Richard but Christ. As a clergyman, Carlisle should be teaching the King no less than the King's subjects a peacemaking grounded in Christian morals. His failure to do this is the measure of his shortcomings as a counselor. The consequence of this bishop's servility to a merely "fashionable" piety is a counselling limited to fatalistic predictions. No shepherding action of reconciliation is attempted.

Church officials of dubious counsel can be found also in King John and Henry V. Cardinal Pandulph in King John enters just after the English and French kings have compromised their rival claims by a convenient marriage and sworn peace. Concerned solely with correcting John's contumacious attitude toward the Pope, Pandulph demands that King Philip break with John and use military means to coerce John to obey the Holy Father. Philip in response pleads: "Out of your grace, devise, ordain, impose, / Some gentle order, and then we shall be blest." But grace and blessing are far from Pandulph's mind. He replies by polarizing the issue: all order is "orderless" except what is opposite to England's love. Philip's primary duty is to be "Champion of our Church"—a concept Pandulph does not examine but interprets to mean a simple subservience to his own disciplinary decree. He
amplifies with an impressive display of syllogistic argument: Philip’s peace, he explains, is a mistaken vow which falsifies Philip’s vow first made to Heaven; hence “The better part of purposes mistook is to mistake again,” since thereby “falsehood falsehood cures.” This is like saying, is it not, that two wrongs make a right? Furthermore, it overlooks the fact that every Christian’s first vow is his baptismal one to serve Christ, a vow which Pandulph is either overlooking or mistaking (like some Pharisee) by equating it with serving a church bureaucracy’s political action program. King Philip, alas, is victimized by a logic he cannot penetrate. But Shakespeare’s play shows, before its end, that the only sense in which falsehood cures falsehood is through a general breakdown of the claims of all parties, their pretensions being quite literally “washed out” by providential disasters.

And I would suggest that there is a not dissimilar total story in the cycle of events which stretches, in Shakespeare’s dramatization, from the beginning of Henry V through Henry VI to a final recovery from confusion at the end of Richard III. This cycle begins with counsel given King Henry by an Archbishop—to “unwind your bloody flag” and invade France out of duty to alleged ancestral rights. It ends with this whole project in collapse and England itself in such desperate straits that peace can begin again only by rallying behind a peripheral but uncontaminated person, Richmond, comparable to Prince Henry at the end of King John. Canterbury’s counsel in Henry V, like Pandulph’s in King John, rests on elaborately tortuous logic, bewildering except for its confident conclusion. It is welcomed as good counsel, however, because in this case the policy it sanctions suits the subsurface self-interests of the King, the nobles, and the churchmen. Shakespeare has a remarkable historical sense of how the temper of the times (for gamesmanship in Henry’s age, and commodity-seeking in John’s) can bias counsel in high places.

In the histories and tragedies, truly good counsel is rare. When we find it, it comes usually from someone who is out of step with the values dominant in the social scene. It crops up, for instance, in Prince Arthur’s plea to his overly ambitious mother, Constance: “I do beseech you, madame, be content.” Another instance is in Henry V, in the wayside counsel of
plain-soldier Williams to his disguised monarch: "If the cause be not good, the King himself hath a heavy reckoning to make." Henry, of course, evades questioning the justice of his cause. In *Richard III*, however, a concern for true justice prompts the virtuous Queen Elizabeth to counsel Dorset to "hie thee from this slaughterhouse" and "live with Richmond." This counsel is specifically approved as "wise" by Lord Stanley, who earlier had sought to save Hastings by sending him a message warning of danger, divined in a dream. Similarly, in *Julius Caesar*, the danger Caesar's wife divines in a dream prompts her to urge her husband to "not go forth today" nor let his wisdom be "consumed in confidence." And in *Antony and Cleopatra*, there is the wise counsel a rustic clown gives to suicide-prone Cleopatra—to give the worm "nothing, I pray you, for it is not worth the feeding.

The good counselors I have mentioned in this paragraph (with the exception of Stanley) are all women, children, or commoners—the weak or meek of the earth. And Stanley's counsel resembles Malcolm's wise counsel to Donalbain, "Let's not consort with them," "let us not be dainty of leave-taking / But shift away." In a wicked world good counsel must sometimes be "shifty" in tactics—as Malcolm is in testing Macduff, or as Queen Elizabeth is when evading Richard's proposal—but always as guided by a goodness of heart.

Some of the best counselling in *King Lear*—and certainly the most sustained—is offered by a Fool and by a pretended Tom o' Bedlam. Counsel here wears the shift of lowliness, both for self-protection and to match or mirror the King's own outcast state. The Fool as "schoolmaster" and the madman as "philosopher" teach Lear indirectly, using as means the covert language of gnomic jest and riddling oracle. Both aim at bringing Lear to self-knowledge, by deflating his self-righteous reason and substituting a down-to-earth recognition of human folly, or of the "foul fiend" that blights human judgment. The Fool, as boy, can advise Lear in nursery-rhyme adage to "have more than thou showest, / Speak less than thou knowest"; can chide him for having "little wit in thy bald crown when thou gavest thy golden one away"; and can level all pretensions with the boast: "I am better than thou are now, I am a fool, thou art nothing." It is the Fool who brings Lear to confess regarding Cordelia: "I did her wrong."
There yet lingers in Lear, however, the misplaced indignation of his unregenerate heart. So long as this remains, the Fool sagely insists, mere efforts of self-control (as in Lear's resolve to "down" his rising heart) are futile—as futile as a cockney's knapping of eels with a stick crying "Down wantons, down." And equally misplaced are Lear's cries invoking thunder to crack the germens that make "ingrateful man." Lear would do better, the Fool counsels, to seek shelter from thunderstorm by practicing some gratitude himself: "Nuncle, in, and ask thy daughter's blessing . . . He that has a house to put 's head in has a good headpiece," preferable to the codpiece which houses rude will. Such counsel brings Lear to at least a half-way penitence: "I will be the pattern of all patience, I will say nothing." Eventually, Lear will have to learn to say "nothing"; but for the moment he has achieved some balance between "grace and a codpiece," i.e., between "a wise man and a fool." The balance is unstable, because as yet Lear will admit only that he is "More sinned against than sinning." Even so, sin in himself is being confessed, and with it a demand that men of "seeming" virtue "cry . . . grace" of the great gods that summon men to justice. It is at this point that Lear's wits begin to "turn"—from indignation to pity for "my fellow," the Fool, and to gratitude for a straw hovel.

It is a nice question who are the better counselors in King Lear—the Fool and Edgar, or on the other hand those who counsel Lear in the opening scene, the Earl of Kent and the King of France. Kent is obviously brave and dutiful in speaking up to protest Lear's "hideous rashness." But is there not on Kent's part an unnecessary advertising of his virtue, especially in his contrasting of his own "honor" with the King's "folly," and in his dare, "Kill thy physician"? Kent's decision to be "unmannerly / When Lear is mad" makes him an ineffective physician. Moreover, his defense of Cordelia's answer as just and "most rightly said" is questionable, if one pauses to ask whether in fact love is quantifiable and divisible into halves. France, who enters only in time to hear Lear's disparaging of Cordelia, speaks up for her on quite other grounds—that he cannot believe her offense to be of such unnatural degree as to monster it, and that the speech of hers which he hears shows but a "tardiness" in nature. France's
chief concern, sensibly, is not to rebuke Lear but rather to press his own faith in the dowerless daughter and provide her a place in France as his Queen.

Some years ago, O. J. Campbell characterized Kent (in "The Salvation of Lear," ELH, 1945) as "the Stoic plain man," and commented further: "Here, as elsewhere in the play, Shakespeare insists that the stoic way to salvation from turbulent and unworthy emotion is psychologically unsound—that passion cannot be conquered by force of Reason, but only by the substitution for the destructive emotion of a stronger and nobler passion" (p. 103). The Fool, a wise innocent, sees the limitation in Kent's loyalty to Lear. When Kent trips up Oswald and Lear thanks him for this "friendly" service, giving him money, the Fool comments: "Let me hire him. Here's mycoxcomb." The foolish Kent himself becomes rash when dealing with Oswald. By picking a quarrel with this "finical rogue" because "anger hath a privilege," Kent merely duplicates Lear's weakness and gets himself put in stocks by Cornwall.

It is in Shakespeare's comedies that wise and effective counselors are most often found. Because the genre of comedy is not tied to historical fact, the dramatist is free to imagine ideal possibilities and introduce one or more good counselors who act as guardians to other characters. This is the case, for example, in As You Like It, where the good old servant Adam counsels Orlando to flee Oliver's house and offers for the journey his own life-savings, and where Rosalind as Ganymede undertakes to cure Orlando's lovesickness by witty counsel and finds occasion to cure proud Phoebe as well. The counsel Rosalind gives Phoebe, "Know thyself...And thank Heaven...for a good man's love," sums up her own philosophy and practice. Comparable to the loyal Adam of As You Like It, but at a courtly level, is Helicanus in Pericles, who counsels his prince to flee the rage of Antiochus by leaving Tyre for travels at sea, whereby Pericles may both spare his people the tempest of a war and teach himself patience. This advice, daringly offered in contrast to the flattery of other courtiers, rescues Pericles from his immediate melancholy and cements a friendship which endures throughout the play. In Act V, when the reported death of Marina has cast Pericles into a second despondency, Helicanus is the ship's
“reverent sir” who omits nothing that “bears recovery name” and is rewarded by witnessing the family reunions. In Much Ado the wise counselling of Friar Francis saves a slandered bride when not merely the groom but her own father also is behaving like an ass. Trained by reading and observation to perceive genuine innocence, the Friar invokes “My reverence, calling, [and] divinity” to correct Hero’s father and then to suggest a strategy for quenching the public infamy. His strategy, if I may borrow a phrase from Dogberry, condemns Claudio “into everlasting redemption” by providing for Hero a way to “die to live.” One might mention also, in Pericles, Marina’s wise counseling of Lysimachus by appealing to his better nature. As a result this Governor, who “would have dealt with her like a nobleman,” goes away instead saying his prayers.

In The Merchant of Venice Portia’s well-timed counselings dominate the play. Quite aware that it is not as easy to do as to “know what were good to do,” she is remarkably inventive of ways of doing good. Bassanio’s choosing of the right casket is secretly aided (as Albert Wertheim has shown in Shakespeare Studies, VI) by her many hints when counseling Bassanio before his choice. Later, disguised as a lawyer, she offers Shylock good counsel in advising him to take thrice the money, as well as by her proclaiming the blessedness of mercy. That mercy speech probably influences the Duke’s immediate offer of pardon of life to Shylock once Shylock is caught, and also it is a likely cause of Antonio’s more complex proposal to satisfy Shylock’s protest against loss of his wealth. Antonio’s proposal carries a many-sided mercy, which modern readers often fail to appreciate. Its hidden mercy is the means it provides for Shylock’s reconciliation with his daughter and for ending Shylock’s social alienation.

Portia has good counsel also for Bassanio when asking of him his ring. “If your wife be not a madwoman,” Portia promises, “She would not hold out enemy forever / For giving it to me.” This counsel, by prompting Bassanio to prefer gratitude ahead of conventional vow, makes possible his learning later, amid the camouflage of boisterous teasing, his duty to a wife who is also a Doctor. Portia’s counseling has a mystery to reveal under all her surface counseling, namely, the essential harmony of sexual
fidelity with a higher gratitude to the stranger who acts as doctor-friend and who as doctor is the spouse's other self, a self not won by fortune-hunting but given freely. Portia's going on a "pilgrimage" has not been wholly pretence: it signalizes the religious dimension which underlies her whole strategy for perfecting justice through mercy and nature through secret grace. Gracious friendship is the final and inner meaning of the love a ring merely symbolizes.

This is true also of Camillo's love for Leontes and for Polixenes in The Winter's Tale. Camillo is not being unfriendly to Leontes, I'd say, when he secretly-deserts him to act as a pilot and "father" to Polixenes, nor is he, later, unfriendly to Polixenes when he secretly helps Florizel escape from Polixenes. A recent critic (R. A. Foakes in Shakespeare: The Dark Comedies) seems to me mistaken in thinking Camillo "disloyal" in these actions. To so judge is to overlook the outcome which Camillo aims at, an eventual reconciliation of the two kings. Camillo is perhaps Shakespeare's finest example of a Good Counselor in the arena of court diplomacy. We cannot but note that Leontes, when seeking Camillo's counsel, refers to his past services as "priest-like"; and that when repenting (in III.ii) he praises him as "most humane," honorable, and pious. Polixenes, after sixteen years of Camillo's service in Bohemia, pleads to retain "good Camillo"; and Florizel, on receiving counsel from him, calls him the "medicine of our house." Appropriately at the end of the story, Camillo is joined in marriage to Paulina, the other major guardian figure in the total action.

Camillo's behavior in his first crisis, that occasioned by Leontes's jealousy, shows him to be more discreet and mannerly than was Kent in King Lear. To Leontes' assertion that "My wife's a hobbyhorse" and his demand that Camillo agree and justify the judgment, Camillo replies: "'Shrew my heart, / You never spoke what did become you less / Than this, which to reiterate were sin / As deep as that, though true." When Leontes persists, Camillo replies pleadingly: "'Good my lord, be cured / Of this diseased opinion, and betimes, / For 'tis most dangerous." "'Tis true," retorts Leontes, and Camillo replies simply: "No, no, my lord." His moral courage is here evident, and his diplomacy becomes further evident in what follows. He
parries Leontes’ suggestion that a true servant ought to show loyalty by poisoning “mine enemy” from Bohemia. Ambiguously, Camillo promises to “fetch off” Bohemia, and to give him no “wholesome beverage.” But he keeps this promise by giving Bohemia the unwholesome news of Leontes’ sick purpose, and then offering to fetch off Bohemia from this danger.

Camillo’s second crisis comes years later when Polixenes, on discovering his son’s intention to marry Perdita, demands angrily a breakup of the match as being too “base” for “a scepter’s heir.” Here is an eruptive jealousy comparable to Leontes’ jealousy, motivated by a selfish concern for status. Blinded by this, Polixenes forgets his earlier admiration for Perdita, terms her now “excellent witchcraft,” threatens to scratch her beauty, and to devise a cruel death for Florizel if he disobeys fatherly decree. When Polixenes then stomps off, Camillo stays behind to make closer inquiry. He listens to a Perdita dismayed by the collapse of her dream, and to a Florizel made desperate by his affection and determined to lose all inheritance rather than violate his faith and oath to Perdita. “We profess ourselves,” says Florizel, “to be slaves of change.” Camillo as a remedy asks them to “embrace by my direction,” which offers “A course more promising / Than a wild dedication of yourself / To unpathed waters.” In then assigning them the roles of ambassador and princess, Camillo has a kind of prophetic insight into their real and true natures; for through pretending these roles the lovers become what they play.

Camillo’s plan turns “flight” into mission—a mission in accord with love for Polixenes. In Florizel’s representing Polixenes as sending friendship to Leontes, the plan dissimulates immediate truth in order to elicit and fulfil potential truth. For although Polixenes (in IV.ii.) has pushed aside Camillo’s wish to return to Sicily to “allay” the penitent King’s sorrows, his stated reason was his need of Camillo’s “goodness” for the sake of “my profit, therein, the heaping friendships.” This very profit of friendship, but in a surprising mode, Camillo intends to heap on Polixenes through a strategy secretly devised for the good of everyone. Florizel, informed of only part of the strategy, welcomes it as “almost a miracle.” It later turns indeed into miracle when, by providential accident, Camillo and Polixenes encounter in Sicily the Old Shepherd, whom Polixenes threatens but Camillo
questions and thereby discovers proof of Perdita's royalty. In this incident Camillo's alertness to search out hidden possibility crowns his diplomacy. His art, we may say, illustrates one of the themes of the play: art mends nature when nature itself makes the means by which it is bettered.

Paulina is initially less diplomatic as a counsellor, but learns patience through trial and error. On hearing of Hermione's imprisonment Paulina undertakes to be a bold advocate, taking along Hermione's new-born child in hope of softening the King's heart. Determined not to be "honey-mouthed," she is at this point overconfident of her ability to "do good," forgetting to apply to herself her own adage that "The silence often of pure innocence / Persuades when speaking fails." Her audacity is almost as blunt as Kent's in King Lear as she intervenes:

Good my liege, I come—
And I beseech you hear me, who professes
My self your loyal servant, your physician,
Your most obedient counselor, yet that dares
Less appear so in comforting your evils
Than such as most seem yours—I say I come
From your good Queen.

When Leontes retorts, "Good Queen!", Paulina tosses back the phrase three times repeated, and adds that she would "by combat make her good, so were I a man." Inevitably, this approach merely exasperates Leontes. In a rising anger he terms her witch, crone, Dame Partlet, and gross hag, orders her out, and gives command for both the baby and the Queen to be burnt.

Hermione, when answering the King's charges in a previous scene, had firmly asserted innocence but had not retaliated, as Paulina here does, with a charge of tyranny. Hermione had spoken, rather, of the grief his "mistake" would give him when he came to a "clearer knowledge," and she had exited with a promise to undertake an action "for my better grace."

Paulina's initial shortcoming might be measured, it occurs to me, by comparing her tactics with some sage norms for counselors which St. Gregory gives in his Pastoral Care. Gregory urges (in III.iv) that "the deeds of superiors are not to be smitten with the sword of the mouth, even when they are rightly judged to be worthy of blame." Consider rather, says Gregory, the pious David who humbly took care not to smite Saul, but only to cut,
as it were silently, the border of his robe. Quoting Eccles. 7:9, “Better is the patient than the arrogant,” Gregory admonishes (in III.ix) that “in truth, one that is patient chooses to suffer any evils whatever rather than that his hidden good should come to be known through the vice of ostentation.” A fool utterest all his mind, but a wise man putteth it off, and reserves it till afterwards (Prov. 29:11). This is advice which Elizabethans could have known through King Alfred’s translation of Gregory’s Pastoral Care or through other intermediary sources. Shakespeare’s gracious Hermione practices it instinctively. Paulina too comes to it, but only after her compassion for Leontes has been aroused by his repentant response to the diatribe she adds after the oracle has discredited Leontes and he has been humbled by the death of his son and apparent death of his wife. We can see the turning point in Paulina when she expresses sorrow for her faults and asks to be forgiven as having been a “foolish woman.”

From then on, Paulina becomes a mature pastor, the guardian of Leontes’ penance and his protector against backsliding. She safeguards Leontes against falling in love illicitly sixteen years later with his own unknown daughter (as Greene’s king had done), by reminding him of his promise never to marry but by her consent. “Care not for issue, / The crown will find an heir” is the promise she holds out—a promise as paradoxical as the biblical one given Abraham. Leontes shall marry again, but only when “your first Queen’s given breath” and not till then. “It is required” only, says Paulina in the chapel scene, that “You do awake your faith . . . . Dear life redeems you.” And Leontes then, rapt by the music of Paulina’s spell, as holy as lawful, finds her magic “an art / Lawful as eating.” The outcome is indeed like “an old tale”—analogously the biblical one: “Every wink of the eye, some new grace will be born.” Or, as St. Paul says in I. Cor. 15: “How are the dead raised up? . . . We shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye.”

Shakespeare’s fullest example of a good counselor, good from beginning to end, is to be found in still another play, Measure for Measure. Duke Vincentio’s virtues, and his strategy, I can not adequately detail in this present essay. But let us note the brief sermon which he offers in I.i.29-40 when launching his reform of Vienna: its theme is everyman’s duty to Heaven and to Nature to
produce "fine issues" which will show gratitude to these donors, rather than a wasting of one's virtues on oneself or a wasting of oneself on one's virtues. This sermon is analogous (as G. Wilson Knight has commented in his Wheel of Fire) to the biblical parable of the talents. The ideal to be achieved is a profit both natural and divine—a profit which as the play develops, is distorted by both Angelo and Isabella until Vincentio intervenes to educate Isabella and discipline Angelo. "Craft against Vice I must supply" is his tactic, while the "rule of charity" is his governing motive.

The turning point comes when Vincentio as Friar intervenes with a gracious plea: "Vouchsafe a word, young sister, but one word." The indignant Isabella, at this point, has just vowed 'No word to save' her brother Claudio. Vincentio's "one word," introduced with great courtesy and diplomacy, expands into a large plan, not all of which he immediately makes known—perhaps because he remembers the proverb I quoted a moment ago: "A fool uttereth all his mind, but a wise man putteth it off, and reserves it till afterwards." Vincentio begins by promising Isabella a "satisfaction" which is "likewise your own benefit." Then, a moment later, he offers gentle sermon for correcting the imbalance of her present attitude: "The goodness that is cheap in beauty makes beauty brief in goodness, but grace being the soul of your complexion, shall keep the body of it ever fair." Her won resolve to denounce Angelo he then incorporates but redirects: it "shall not be much amiss," he says, while supplying her with a context of larger "remedy" for doing good. Her negative outburst over Angelo's treatment of Mariana ("What a corruption in this life, that it will let this man live!") is also redirected: "It is a rupture that you may easily heal." Without telling Isabella that the "bedmate" substitution (analogous to a vicarious atonement) will ultimately lead to a healing even of the enemy Angelo, he reserves that truth while stressing the plan's benefit for Mariana and Claudio and herself, and thus he enlists her cooperation. Later, when Angelo breaks his bargain, Vincentio allows her to suppose her brother has been beheaded—thereby to fan her desire for justice but also coach it through Friar Peter and temper it, so that at the moment when finally justice is awarded, Isabella can be prompted by Mariana's
pleas to forgive the sinner Angelo and ask mercy for him. At this
dpoint Vincentio can bring forth the evidence of his own sub rosa
mercy for the saving of Claudio and Angelo alike. His counseling
has exemplified how a godly guardian and Christian “Brother”
works to teach mercy while safeguarding justice.

Modernist critics who are ignorant of the subtlety of Christian
morals have found much to complain of in Vincentio’s behavior.
He has been termed “Machiavellian” by A. D. Nuttall (in
Shakespeare Studies, IV), who also complains of the “Grand
Inconsistency” of the play as a whole. He has been denounced,
borrowing Lucio’s words, as a “superficial, ignorant, and un­
weighing” fellow, by Hal Gelb (in Shakespeare Quarterly, XXII,
1971), who subtitles his essay “All’s Not Well That Ends Well.”
Lucio’s view of Vincentio as a fantastical Duke of dark corners”
has likewise been adopted by R. A. Foakes (in Shakespeare: The
Dark Comedies), who accuses Vincentio not only of deceiving
but of telling lies, and who claims that only Barnardine’s obstina­
cy “precipitates the Duke to reveal himself.” Actually, however
anyone who consults the play will find that Vincentio’s promise
of the Duke’s return “within these two days,” and also his
biblical announcement that “the unfolding star calls up the
Shepherd,” occur before his encounter with obstinate
Barnardine. Granted that his obstinacy modified Vincentio’s plan
of mere justice of Barnardine, can we say more than that it
prompts Vincentio to look for some remedy even for the spiritual
state of this reprobate murderer and thus to welcome the
“accident that Heaven provides” for extending mercy to
Barnardine and Claudio alike? Providential “accident” assisted
Camillo similarly in The Winter’s Tale, but I think no careful
reader finds heaven’s help inconsistent with the faith and hope of
Camillo which preceded this added assistance.

And as for the Duke’s supposed lies to Isabella regarding
Claudio’s death, critics such as Foakes (and also Clifford Leech,
who in Shakespeare Survey, III, makes a field-day of this point
in his Empson-like cock-a-snook at theological interpretation), I
can only recommend some reading in Aquinas. Aquinas says
(Summa Theologica II-II.110-111) that for a good purpose one
may withhold information and need not tell all he knows; and
further, that some *seeming* lies are not so at all but involve, rather, statements which are true in a prophetic, mystical, or figurative sense—as for instance in the *outwardly* misleading statements which Jacob made to blind Isaac under prompting from holy Rebecca. If some modern critics could but learn to look for “figurative” truth underneath charitable dissimulation, and more basically could grasp the traditional meaning of charity so as to recognize it when exhibited, their complaints as to Vincentio’s so-called “lying” would evaporate. Figuratively, anyone who repents becomes *dead* to his worldly former self (as, e.g., does Malcolm’s mother who “died every day she lived”), and thus there is no untruth in the Duke’s reporting Claudio as having died. And as for a further complaint, voiced by Leech and others, that the sermon given Claudio by Vincentio is pagan rather than Christian, that complaint is misconceived. Vincentio’s friarly sermon is no more pagan than that of the biblical Ecclesiastes, which declares all mortal life vanity; and although this approach is sub-Christian it coheres with Christian teaching by furnishing a propaedeutic adapted to naturalistic minds (such as Claudio’s) while at the same time the Friar is arranging for Claudio to discover, through personal *experience*, the higher truth of resurrection through grace. There is a timing, in Christian counseling, which recapitulates stages in salvation-history.

Space precludes in my present essay any elaborate analysis of Vincentio’s complex strategy for using his “journey” as a penance for his own prior vice (the disorder to which he gave “permissive pass”) by practicing during his “visit” a forgiving of neighbor through a justice that subserves mercy. It may be said, however, that Vincentio seems quite aware of the truth of Portia’s sermon in *The Merchant of Venice*, that since in the course of Justice alone “none of us should see salvation,” prayer for mercy “doth teach us all to render / The deeds of mercy.” Vincentio’s method as a ruler fulfills, I would say, a mixing of “rod and staff” such as St. Gregory advocated in his *Pastoral Care*:

David says, Thy rod and thy staff, they have comforted me (Ps. 23:4). For with a rod we are smitten, with a staff we are supported. If, then, there is the constraint of the rod for striking, there should be also the comfort of the staff for supporting. Wherefore let there be love, but not enervating; let there be vigour, but not exasperating; let there be zeal, but
not immoderately burning; let there be pity, but not sparing more than expedient; that, while justice and mercy blend themselves together in supreme rule, he who is at the head may both soothe the hearts of his subjects in making them afraid, and yet in soothing them constrain them to reverential awe. (11.6)

Angelo’s awe when repenting, and Isabella’s when she begs pardon, are evidence of Vincentio’s remedial rectorship. He has been “as holy as severe,” and has counseled no norms which he does not himself practice.

Our foray into the problem of the Good Counselor in Shakespeare might also include mention of Helena in All’s Well, especially her counsel to the weak-faithed King whom she offers to cure:

He that of greatest works is finisher
Oft does them by the weakest minister.
So Holy Writ in babes hath judgment shown
When judges have been babes. Great floods have flown
From simple sources, and great seas have dried
When miracles have by the greatest been denied.

The seeming impossible becomes possible by this King’s consenting to Helena’s “Grace lending grace,” her experiment with the “help of Heaven.” Other good counselors, such as Lafeu, have enough faith in her to introduce her to the King, but their goodness lacks her ardor and her biblical inspiration. It is that inspiration, we must suppose, which leads her on a pilgrimage (associated with the names both of St. James and St. Francis), by which she redeems even Bertram, more through her silent action than through her ambiguous verbal counseling. A hidden guardianship perfects the office of Good Counselor.

We have opened up, if nothing else in this paper, the complexity of the office of good counselor. In counseling, as in all arts, there are degrees of good, better, and best. The best have a keen insight into the need of the person being counseled, his state of mind, and his circumstances. They also have a charity congruent with Christian norms, even when (as in the case of Camillo, or the Fool, or Edgar) not specifically founded on a Christian cultural background. On the other hand, counselors can be “good” by varying standards, any one of which the reader may choose to endorse if his own standards are similar. In tragedy, however, the reader needs to be aware that what he may be inclined to endorse as good is in many cases a defective
good, or a distorted good. Pursuit of a seeming good motivates the tragic counseling of a Cassius or Brutus, a Hamlet senior, or a Bishop of Carlisle. The difference between appearance and reality in the area of moral goodness is a test set for the reader; each drama's outcome helps us discover which is which if we have eyes to see. Shakespeare does not deal in stereotypes. He sets before us analogies to everyday possibility, and he enhances the attractions of truly good counseling by exhibiting its quality of the mysterious, the riddling, the salvific.

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SHAKESPEARE'S SONNETS OF PARTICIPATION
by James A. Devereux, S.J.

Precisely how things stood between the poet and his friend in Shakespeare's Sonnets can hardly be put in words more satisfactory than the poet's own. The Sonnets themselves are raids on the inarticulate—attempts to capture in metaphor and conceptual structure a human experience that refuses definition. Still, the poet returns again and again to the field, and so may we, as sympathetic and wonder-struck observers. Now among the forms of thought that Shakespeare brings to bear upon the heart of his own mystery, one has received little attention and seems to me to merit a great deal: it is the notion of participation. The clearest instance of its use may be found in sonnet 37:

As a decrepit father takes delight
To see his active child do deeds of youth . . .

where in the sestet the poet declares:

. . . I in thy abundance am suffic'd,
And by a part of all thy glory live (11-12).

The notion of participation originated in Plato, who described the relationship of spatial or sensible things to the ideal forms as one of sharing or participating in the forms' perfection. "It seems to me that, if a beautiful thing exists which is inferior to beauty in itself, it can only be beautiful because it participates in beauty itself; and so it goes, of course for all other things." (Phaedo, 100 C; cf. 101 C). Though rejected by Aristotle, the idea was taken up by Plotinus, and then by Augustine, Boethius, Pseudo-Dionysius, Thomas Aquinas, and Marsilio Ficino, thus becoming a key notion in Christian thought, where it was chiefly used to account for the relationship of creatures to God. Etymologically, the word "participate" means to take or have a part of the whole: philosophically, participation in God implied a sharing in the fullness of God's being that safeguards both His infinity and the particularity of creatures. Created beings have no perfection that does not come from God; but by participating in Him they do not constitute an integral part of the divine being, or add to or subtract from God. I should also note that the
notion was sometimes applied to the logical or conceptual order; thus, a species was said to participate in its genus. For example, the concept of man participates in that of animal, since it shares but does not exhaust the latter concept.

Though it does not make use of the philosophical notion as such, the New Testament speaks of the relationship of Christians to Christ in such a way that later writers applied to this, too, the word *participation*. Thus, in I Corinthians Christians are members of the body of Christ, and in Hebrews 3:14 they are called sharers in Christ, a sharing of which Jesus Himself speaks in John 13:18 and 14:30, and illustrates in the parable of the vine and the branches (John 15:1-9).

Echoes of these patterns of thought may be heard in sonnet 37 and in more than a dozen of the poems that Shakespeare addressed to the friend. The idea of participation does not always involve both friend and poet. Often it simply provides a vehicle for exalting the young man’s beauty. One thinks of sonnet 53, “What is your substance, whereof are you made, / That millions of strange shadows on you tend?” (1-2), the gist of which is that the friend is an ideal form in which the loveliness of everything beautiful in nature and art participates: “And you in every bleséd shape we know” (12). Whether or not Shakespeare read the *Phaedo*, he is certainly putting Plato’s notion of participation to use in this exclamation of admiring love. A pair of sonnets, 67 and 68, make the friend a source and exemplar of the beauty that Nature keeps in store, and one that exposes the deceptions of mere artifice. Still another pair, 98 and 99, discover in the friend’s beauty the pattern of the summer’s loveliness:

Nor did I wonder at the lily’s white,
Nor praise the deep vermillion of the rose;
They were but sweet, but figures of delight
Drawn after you, you pattern of all those (98.9-12).

In all these sonnets the friend is a universal ideal of beauty and love, admired, as it were, from afar. But elsewhere the poet introduces himself into the relationship with the friend conceived as an ideal form, sometimes discreetly, sometimes with astonishing boldness. In sonnet 106, “When in the chronicle of wasted time,” he takes his place among the poets of his age who look upon the friend’s beauty as their inspiration and source, just as past poets had somehow discerned it in prophecy:
For we which now behold these present days
Have eyes to wonder, but lack tongues to praise (13-14).

Here, and even more clearly in sonnet 101, the friend is the source, the cause, and the exemplar not only of truth and beauty but also of poetry:

O truant Muse, what shall be thy amends
For thy neglect of truth in beauty dyed?
Both truth and beauty on my love depends:
So dost thou too, and therein dignified (1-4).

For our poet, then, the poem is not so much an act of autonomous creation as a sharing in the friend's perfection.

But there is more. I think it can be shown—though I shall not attempt it here—that whenever, in the so-called immortalizing conceit, the poet promises his friend life through poetry, the poetic act is always subordinated to love—to wishing the good and life itself for the friend. So, too, in sonnets 101 and 106 that I have just discussed, if the friend is the first principle and source of art, he is still more the source of love and life. By partaking of the friend's fullness of perfection, the poet's own life is thereby restored. Sonnet 37 could hardly be clearer:

As a decrepit father takes delight
To see his active child do deeds of youth,
So I, made lame by Fortune's dearest spite,
Take all my comfort of thy worth and truth;
For whether beauty, birth, or wealth, or wit,
Or any of these all, or all, or more,
Entitled in thy parts, do crowned sit,
I make my love engrafted to this store:
So then I am not lame, poor, nor despis'd,
Whilst that this shadow doth such substance give
That I in thy abundance am suffic'd,
And by a part of all thy glory live:
Look what is best, that best I wish in thee;
This wish I have—then ten times happy me!

The pattern of participation that Shakespeare here suggests is both philosophical and biblical. Line 10 plays on the Platonic words "shadow" and "substance," signalling the realm of discourse on which the poet draws. Yet the poem is not concerned with sharing in an ideal form but in a particular substance that somehow has the properties of such a form. The poet affirms both the insufficiency of his own being and the abundance of the friend's, in whom perfection is found in its fullness. What is more, the poet is able to partake of that
abundance and derive life from the friend’s absolute sufficiency (11-12).

There is still more. Certain other lines suggest that the poet receives from the friend not only life but saving grace. Lines 9 to 12 abound in echoes of Pauline texts about the Christian’s incorporation in Christ. “Engrafted to this store” recalls the metaphor of grafting in Romans 11:17-24, as well as the parable of the vine and the branches (John 15:1-9). II Corinthians is full of the contract between man’s weakness and God’s sufficiency. Thus, the Lord assures Paul: “My grace is sufficient for thee: for my strength is made perfect in weakness. Most gladly therefore will I rather glory in infirmities, that the power of Christ may rest upon me. Therefore I take pleasure in infirmities, in reproaches, in necessities, in persecutions, in distresses for Christ’s sake; for when I am weak, then am I strong” (12:9-10; see also 3:5 and 9:8). Such language is echoed in sonnet 37, and adds a religious overtone to the idea of participation. But there is no question of Christ figures in the poem; for the poet, it is the friend himself through whose power he is no longer poor or despised; the friend is the vine to whom his love is engrafted, by whose participated glory he lives.

Variations on the same theme of personal participation are found in 31, “Thy bosom is endeared of all hearts,” where the friend embodies all the poet’s past loves; in 39, where the friend is “all the better part of me” (2); and in 109 and 112, where he professes that the friend is “my all” (109.13) and “my all-the world” (112.5), apart from which the universe is “nothing,” and “dead.” In these last three instances the notion of participation is used without specifically religious overtones. But here and in every instance where it is used, the poet declares the friend to be a principle of absolute value and a source of new being in which he shares.

What are we to make of these sonnets? What can the poet’s intention be? One can easily imagine Berowne behind a tree muttering “pure, pure idolatry! / God amend us, God amend!” (L.L.L., IV. iii. 74-75). At least we may be sure that the poet’s devotion to his friend is not, like that of the Court of Navarre, love “in the liver vein, which makes flesh a deity.” The poet shares in a love of “air and purging fire” (45.1); his is a marriage

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of minds. Still, however spiritual the union, one of its partners seems to assume a status of measureless superiority and life-giving abundance. Yet that partner is not an ideal form in Plato's sense, much less the Lord Himself incarnate.

In the end I am not sure whether one can do much more than define the problem that these sonnets pose. And to complete that definition, I must complicate the matter still further by reminding you of a second group of poems to the friend that imply a framework parallel to, yet in apparent conflict with the sonnets of participation. In sonnet 76, for instance, the poet assures his friend that "you and love are still my argument." The same distinction between the beloved and love itself is made in sonnet 108. There "eternal love" seems to be both the force which engenders a response, and an objective reality, distinct from the friend, to which the poet attends. In sonnet 56 the friend recedes from view while the poet addresses "Sweet love" alone as a kind of absolute and in the sestet looks, not for the friend's return, but for the "return of love" (12). Still more significant is sonnet 124, which begins,

If my dear love were but a child of state
It might for Fortune's bastard be unfather'd.

His love is a subsistent reality, "builded far from accident," that "all alone stands hugely politic." The tendency to recognize love as a somehow independent being finds its most striking expression in sonnet 116, "Let me not to the marriage of true minds / Admit impediments." Certainly, no poem asserts love itself as an absolute with greater strength. One need only recall the conclusion:

Love alters not with his brief hours and weeks,
But bears it out even to the edge of doom.
If this be error and upon me prov'd,
I never writ, nor no man ever lov'd (11-14).

None of these poems makes use of the language of participation; but all of them seem to me to imply the idea, and to apply it, not to the poet and the friend but to the poet and love itself; understood as an absolute and eternal reality which communicates itself to the poet and elicits in turn his unconditional commitment.

How is this pattern related to the one that I pointed out
Is the friend in this second group subsumed into some larger reality of which he is only an outward and visible sign? Again, I am not sure that the question is answerable. But Renaissance thought does provide an analogue which suggests that we have asked the right question. According to the Florentine philosopher, Marsilio Ficino, within every genus in the universal hierarchy of beings there is a \textit{primum}, an individual that embodies in itself the whole content of that quality or perfection found in the genus and common to its members. The \textit{primum} communicates that quality to the other members, which are therefore related to the universal ideal only through their participation in the \textit{primum}. Thus, the sun is the first in the genus of light-giving beings; it contains in itself the fullness of the ideal form of light, and communicates light to the stars and every other light-bearing being. The \textit{primum} is a concrete individual, distinct from the universal form. Yet because it translates the fullness of the universal form into concrete reality, it represents in Ficino "a speculative identity of the universal and the particular."³

By now the listener will have remarked a parallel between the universal form and the \textit{primum} in Ficino's philosophy, and love and the friend in Shakespeare's sonnets. Obviously, I have no right to list Ficino among Shakespeare's sources. My point is rather that Ficino, perhaps the most representative philosopher of the Renaissance, provided his age with a conceptual pattern which made it possible for a poet to speak at one moment of a Platonic idea of love, and in the next of that idea's complete realization in a single person.

Having observed two modes of participation in the sonnets, and having suggested a model for their relationship in the thought of the age, I must once again ask, "What is to be made of them?"

The answer is, "Not everything." They are not argue-proof. In only two poems of the second group are both the friend and love invoked at the same time. Even then the poems themselves do not raise the question of their interrelationship. That question occurs to readers like me who recall the other participation sonnets, and look for coherence amid apparent disparity. But if the question is legitimate, then the analogy I have drawn to
Ficino's notion of the *primum* within a genus is appropriate, and, I hope, illuminating.

As for the first group of sonnets, the presence there of the notion of participation is certain and significant—significant not only historically but aesthetically. By expressing the attitude of the poet to his friend in a form of thought which millenial tradition had applied to the relationship of contingent beings to the fullness of being, Shakespeare affirms the worth of human love with awesome force and daring. The power of that metaphor is intensified still further when, as in sonnet 37, it assumes explicitly Christian dimensions, and the friend is not only the fullness of perfection but the source of salvation. One understands the poet's wish to forestall objections in sonnet 106, "Let not my love be called idolatry."

Of course, the sonnets of participation are not in the end idolatry. The friend of sonnet 37, "this shadow" that "doth such substance give," is still a shadow. Nor do these sonnets conceal an allegory of divine love, though that is an issue which cannot be resolved without greatly broadening the scope of this study. All the sonnets addressed to the friend attempt to convey the experience of a unique relationship, one for which the poet seeks analogues from the whole range of human experience, natural and artistic, sacred and profane.

The sonnets I have singled out in this paper evoke the Platonic tradition's answer to one mystery—the many and the One—in order to account for another—the poet and the friend. The attempt is doomed to failure from the outset. Mystery remains mystery. But the metaphor that Shakespeare brings to bear on the inarticulate finds its mark all the same. Thanks to its impact, we who participate in these poems feel with their author the mysterious reality that neither he nor we can see. Indeed, at certain privileged moments, we see feelingly.

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Notes


A RESPONSE TO JAMES DEVEREUEx
by Charles R. Forker

Sears Jayne in his important work on Ficino's Platonic Commentary remarks that "Shakespeare knew about Renaissance Neoplatonism, as he seems to have known something about everything current in his day."1 Besides the sonnets, Jayne mentions particularly in this connection Romeo and Juliet, The Phoenix and the Turtle, and The Tempest. Professor Devereux has proved in his carefully argued paper the undeniable validity of Jayne's generalization. If one looks for it, one can find a fair amount of what we might call casual neoplatonism throughout Shakespeare, especially in romantic contexts where Platonic imagery or terminology coincides with the traditions of courtly love and the conventions of Petrarchan rhetoric. Thus Romeo can hyperbolize the beauty of Juliet as "too rich for use, for earth too dear" and imply that by comparison with the more unreal attractions of Rosaline, he "ne'er saw true beauty till this night" (I.v.47-53).2 Valentine in The Two Gentlemen of Verona refers to Silvia as the "essence" by which he is "Fostered, illumined, cherished, kept alive," so that when she is absent, he must "feed upon the shadow of perfection" (III.i.177-184). When the identically dressed twins of Twelfth Night appear for the first time together onstage and Viola in her amazement wonders whether her suddenly materialized double is not some incorporeal spirit, Sebastian employs the same neoplatonic vocabulary to which Professor Devereux has drawn our attention: "A spirit I am indeed, / But am in that dimension grossly clad / Which from the womb I did participate" (V.i.228-230). All these examples (like the ones Fr. Devereux adduces) have in common the idea of a beloved person whose capacity to excite wonder or awe must somehow be accounted for by the intersection in her (or him) of a lower with a higher plane of reality—by some mysterious quality of a universal or spiritual realm of which the individual body is an epiphany or particular manifestation.

This impingement of the physical and spiritual planes upon each other is so common in Renaissance love poetry, whether sacred or profane, and so especially pervasive in sonnet literature from Petrarch onwards, that it would be astonishing not to find at least some remnant of it in Shakespeare's sequence, a sequence
which in its unique way idealizes a human love more profoundly and complexly than any group of lyrics in the language. Much of the neoplatonic glow in Renaissance art, as Edgar Wind has observed, derives from a humanistic urge to reconcile the highest conceptions of Christian virtue and idealism with the sensuous, even hedonistic, attractions of the flesh, particularly as expressed in the philosophy and art of classical paganism. Hence in Titian’s great allegory of Sacred and Profane Love, the two figures, while obviously contrasted, subtly intrude upon each other’s domain of value. Titian may be said to sensualize the sacred figure even as he idealizes the profane one in such a manner as to hint at the mysterious union of opposites. So Donne with a rhetorical technique analogous to Titian’s painting canonizes his secular love by a witty blasphemer as a “reverend” “pattern” for other lovers, who can be but earthbound aspirants to his amorous sainthood (“The Canonization”), and then reverses theological direction in “Batter my heart” by imagining a God whose forcible subduing of the human soul can only be imaged in terms of rape. The intermingling of the sacred and profane, the imaging of the beloved in terms that evoke deity, became standard practice among Renaissance sonneteers, and since we have come to expect this in Sidney, Spenser, and Drayton (where the Platonic theology is more explicit) or in Donne (where it is more self-consciously showy), there is little reason to be puzzled by Shakespeare’s more restrained and implicit use of the same tradition. There is indeed much in Shakespeare’s exaltation of his friend that suggests love as religion. The vocabulary alone—the proliferation of words such as “heavenly,” “celestial,” “repent,” “sins,” “cross,” “confess,” “penitent,” and the like—makes the connection unmistakable.

Nevertheless, it would be a distortion, I think, to imply (as Fr. Devereux’s paper seems to me to imply) that Shakespeare defined either the friend or his own relationship to the friend by means of a systematic or thorough-going reliance on Marsilian categories—to propose, in other words, that the more precise and intellectual tenets of Christian neoplatonism in any sense frame the complex experience of a particular group of sonnets or endow them with philosophic coherence. Stephen Booth reminds us of the necessary indecorum of the idealizing tradition in sonnet
writing: "A witty emphasis on the paradoxically simultaneous pertinence and impertinence of the writer's language and stance to his subject matter is of the essence of the convention." The sonneteer characteristically "relied upon a reader's sense of the frame of reference in which the writer operates and the writer's apparent deviation from that pattern in a rhetorical action that both fits and violates the expected pattern."

In sonnet 37, for instance, Shakespeare devotes three quatrains, as Fr. Devereux has said, to developing the idea of the friend as the fountainhead of abundance and fulfillment from which the writer draws his strength, and the paradoxical idea that the mere shadow of this perfection can impart the substance of richness to its insufficient beholder does indeed consist with Ficino's notion of participation. But the sonnet seems also to recognize the possible inadequacy of this formulation. If the word "shadow" connotes a bodily adumbration of perfect or archetypal form, it also can convey the suggestion of something too rarified and visionary, too cold and abstract, to be experienced with the desired immediacy of human affection. The vocabulary of the sonnet moves progressively from the concrete images of the "decrepit father" and the "active child" to abstract nouns such as "worth," "truth," "beauty," "abundance," and "glory"; and the couplet seems to hesitate a little uncertainly between the flat assertion that the friend does in fact sum up all that "is best" in nature and the poet's fervent wish to impose this hyperbole upon the friend as a means of expressing his love for him. The success of the poem depends to some extent on our experiencing a kind of dialectic between the poet's sense of the friend as he truly is (or at least as the poet fears he may be) and the poet's desire through love to identify the friend with universal perfection and so lift him above the realm where human limitations could possibly matter.

In any event Shakespeare could use the contrast between shadow and substance quite differently in sonnet 53, another of the poems in which Professor Devereux discovers the theology of neoplatonism. This sonnet ("What is your substance, whereof are you made, / That millions of strange shadows on you tend?) inverts the relationship of No. 37 to make the friend not the mediating type or shadow of a higher reality but the very
archetype or substance of which lesser paragons such as Adonis and Helen are only dim reflections or imitations. Yet the heart of the poem is the paradox whereby the friend can be conceived in two logically contradictory senses—as a particular earthly individual who, like any other individual, can cast but a single shadow ("every one hath, every one, one shade"), and as the original of all desirable shadows so that an infinitude of excellent but mutually exclusive forms (male and female, spring and autumn, for instance) derive their "blessed shape" from him. And Shakespeare reinforces the paradox of universality imbedded in human uniqueness with the concluding couplet: "In all external grace you have some part, / But you like none, none you, for constant heart."

This sonnet (53) seems to me typical of Shakespeare's modification of the traditional neoplatonic mode as we are accustomed to encounter it in sixteenth-century love poetry. At the core of Ficino's and Castiglione's doctrine of participation is the assumption that the phenomenal world shares in the perfection of the ideal world and that variety, diversity, multeity, particularity, imperfection, and the emotional and intellectual conflicts of human experience are all ultimately resolvable upward by reference to a transcendent and perfect unity. However ineffable in mystical terms this unity may be, in intellectual and usually in verbal terms it involves a progression from concreteness to higher and higher planes of abstraction. The commonest metaphor, of course, is light. Moreover, in traditional neoplatonism, there is always the sense of the ontological incompleteness of mundane experience, an implication that lower forms of reality, the shadows of the ideal, so to speak, remember their divine origin and yearn to reunite themselves to it. The "mind will be moved, by the searchings of its natural light, to recover the divine light," says Ficino, "and this attraction is the reality of love." Bembo in Castiglione's Courtier speaks of the soul's emancipation from the world of sense: "kindled in the most holy fire of true heavenly love," the soul "fleeth to couple herself with the nature of angels, and . . . clean forsaketh sense. . . ." Such a conception does profoundly inform the poetry of Spenser, who speaks, for instance, of his lady as the pure idea or form of beauty "the light whereof hath kindled heavenly fyre, / In my
fraile spirit by her from basenesse raysed" (Amoretti 3). But when Shakespeare refers repeatedly to his friend as "my angel" in sonnet 144, he does not mean to imply that his beloved inhabits the realm which Ficino designates "the Angelic Mind" and is therefore beyond the possibility of apprehension by the senses. He does not even mean, I believe, that his terrestrial and sublunary angel is an emancipation from God or that God is immanent within the friend in some peculiar fashion that would separate him from the race of fallen humanity. J. W. Lever and J. B. Leishman have argued persuasively that Shakespeare continuously anchors his exaltations of the beloved to the phenomenal world, not by conceiving him as the primum of a genus (which would imply a precise placement of the friend on the ascending ladder which connects the relative with the absolute), but by causing his readers to experience the feeling that his friend, while mutable, flawed, foolish, unfaithful, and immature, is nevertheless a unique incarnation of all that is valuable—that, far from manifesting or emanating a divinity which transcends him, he himself is transcendence in corporeal or natural form. No matter that such a conception is logically irreconcilable with Christian orthodoxy. It is a poetic, not a religious, theology that Shakespeare is articulating, emotionally rather than doctrinally valid for the purpose of converting human devotion for a particular boy into a kind of subjective absolute. One thinks of Cleopatra's defiant rejoinder to a Dollabella who remains skeptical of her outrageously hyperbolical description of Antony:

You lie, up to the hearing of the gods.  
But if there be nor ever were one such,  
It's past the size of dreaming: nature wants stuff  
To vie strange forms with fancy, yet t'imagine  
An Antony were nature's piece 'gainst fancy,  
Condemning shadows quite. (V.ii.95-100)

In sonnet 84 Shakespeare, like Cleopatra, asserts the impossibility of enhancing his love's perfection through art, for a poet can only make "worse what nature made so clear."

The Shakespearean sonnets seem to be too dramatic, too full of psychic conflict and disturbance, too replete with contradictory and unstable feelings, to fit without considerable strain into the discursive, abstract, and finely spun formularies of
Ficino, though at specific points they may of course draw upon ideas with which Ficino was associated for purposes of metaphor or analogy. The relationship with the friend is shadowed by mistrust and fear of repudiation as well as irradiated by adoration, and not infrequently the notion of the friend’s deceptive or flawed beauty colors the praise:

Thus have I had thee as a dream doth flatter,
In sleep a king, but waking no such matter. (87)

How like Eve’s apple doth thy beauty grow
If thy sweet virtue answer not thy showl (93)

For sweetest things turn sourest by their deeds;
Lilies that fester smell far worse than weeds. (94)

The idealization of the friend in terms that sometimes approach idolatry (Shakespeare shows himself aware of the danger in sonnet 105: “Let not my love be called idolatry”) is more or less steadily undercut by a sense of the friend’s actual or potential frailty, and despite the immortality that children or verses or fame may theoretically confer upon him, the painful truth which “Ruin hath taught . . . That Time will come and take my love away” (sonnet 64) can never be wholly negated.

Nevertheless Fr. Devereux does us a valuable service by invoking the concept of participation, for, in looser senses than the Marsilian, the term seems to me essential to Shakespeare’s art. The poet’s psychic need to participate in the identity of his friend, to obliterate his own selfhood and recreate it afresh in the image of the beloved, is everywhere apparent in the sonnets; and such a negatively capable impulse is no more than we should expect to find in the love poetry of the world’s greatest dramatist. In sonnet 71 (“No longer mourn for me when I am dead”) Shakespeare attempts almost to erase his own consciousness by immersing it totally in the imagined consciousness of the friend.

And participation in the sense of a psychological projection of the self is equally a feature of the sequence. Sometimes we observe the “I” of the sonnets, in his struggle to reconcile his perception of the friend’s calculation and hesitancy to commit himself with his own passion for a more ardent response, foster a deliberate self-deception or dramatic wish-fulfillment by imputing his own feelings to the friend and imagining himself as
their object. One of the most poignant examples of the writer’s attempt to father his own heightened awareness upon the coarser sensibilities of the beloved is sonnet 73 (“That time of year thou mayst in me behold”), where with infinite subtlety Shakespeare imagines his own death as the occasion not of his own departure from the friend but of his friend’s departure from him.

But the sonneteer’s imaginative sharing in or partaking of the psyche of his beloved is not the only way in which the concept of participation is apposite. At their best the sonnets give us as readers a sense of participation in the creative activity of loving profoundly, and of striving to articulate emotions that at times very nearly exceed the possibilities of language. We are involved, to borrow Fr. Devereux’s phrase, in “raids on the inarticulate.” The sonnets thus engage us as partners with the poet in the restless search for hyperboles that are powerful enough to create in art the reality which the lover feels (and we feel with him) as simultaneous defect and perfection. Shakespeare forces us to participate in an aesthetic of loving, in a process which entails (as Enobarbus says of Cleopatra) “O’erpicturing that Venus where we see / The fancy outwork nature” (Antony and Cleopatra, II.ii.201-202). The activity proceeds partly out of the poet’s impulse to define what he worships and partly out of his need to solace the pain created by the inevitable incursions of reality upon his cherished and cherishing romanticism. But participation in all these ways involves immersion in a person or experience that is particular, concrete, and for the most part unplatonically limited by the boundaries of the phenomenal universe. The love which Shakespeare celebrates is fundamentally and inescapably human. It need imply no ulterior reality, no absolute but itself.

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Notes


THE USEFULNESS OF NARRATIVE SOURCES AND
THE GOWER CHORUSES IN DETERMINING
A DIVIDED AUTHORSHIP FOR PERICLES
by Nancy C. Michael

Whether or not Shakespeare wrote all of *Pericles* is the central critical problem concerning the play. It has never seriously been doubted that Shakespeare wrote all—or, at the least, most—of the last three acts of *Pericles*. Equally as obvious as Shakespeare’s authorship of Acts III-V is the comparative inferiority of Acts I-II. Are the manifest differences between the two sections of the play the result of separate reporters; or are the differences authorial, signifying that *Pericles* has a divided authorship? Because the only substantive text of the play, the 1609 quarto, is “bad,” the issue is complex, and the question remains unanswered. Even though J. C. Maxwell and F. D. Hoeniger present considerable textual evidence that the differences between Acts I-II and Acts III-V are authorial rather than reportorial, as Phillip Edwards has argued, the textual evidence is insufficient to prove the case for a divided authorship.1 In his eight basic principles for arguing the authenticity of Elizabethan authorship, Samuel Schoenbaum emphasizes that textual demonstration must precede stylistic examination, but that textual evidence must be reinforced by stylistic corroboration.2 Strong stylistic evidence, therefore, is needed to support textual evidence of a divided authorship for *Pericles*.

Toward confirming a divided authorship, I offer two separate, and heretofore unexplored, stylistic analyses of *Pericles*: (1) an examination of the use of narrative sources in the play and (2) a comparison of the prosody and function of the eight Gower choruses. Close examination of the narrative sources on which *Pericles* is based reveals that the two major sources were used in significantly different proportions in the two sections of the play and for different dramatic purposes. Stylistic comparison of the Gower choruses demonstrates the superiority of the verse contained in the choruses in Acts III-V and their more sophisticated dramatic function. I think that the case for a divided authorship is decidedly strengthened when two such different
examinations yield the same conclusion: namely, that Acts I-II and Acts III-V are the work of separate dramatists.

I

*Pericles* is, of course, a dramatization of the legend of Appolonius of Tyre. The hundreds of extant versions of the story written in a score of ancient and modern languages attest to its widespread popularity over a span nearly a thousand years long. In spite of—or, perhaps, because of—its long life and widespread popularity, the story of the wandering Prince of Tyre has remained remarkably intact. This is no less true in the 1609 quarto of *Pericles*, which follows its narrative sources remarkably closely, more closely, in fact, than do any other of Shakespeare's plays of single or divided authorship. (This fact alone seems grounds for calling to question Shakespeare as the sole author of *Pericles.*) Moreover, this closeness exists despite the difficulties involved in converting an episodic romance into a stage play.

The two major narrative sources for *Pericles* are John Gower's verse narrative of Apollonius, Prince of Tyre, contained in his *Confessio Amantis*, Book VIII, and Laurence Twine's prose narrative, *The Patterne of Painefull Adventures*. Gower's *Confessio* (1393) was available in two sixteenth-century editions, those of 1532 and 1554. Twine's romance, entered in the Stationers' Register in 1576, was printed in two known editions, the first undated (c. 1594), the second dated 1607 on the title page. Each of these sources for Pericles is based in turn on separate versions of the Apollonius story: Gower took his story from Godfrey of Viterbo's *Pantheon* (c. 1186); Twine translated into English a French version of the 153rd story in the *Gesta Romanorum*.

Scholars are divided over whether *Pericles* follows Gower or Twine more closely. Maxwell and Hoeniger contend that Gower is the major source, but Elimar Klebs and Geoffrey Bullough hold that Twine's narrative is at least equal in influence to Gower's, if not even greater in Acts IV and V. Maxwell and Hoeniger are correct. Overall, *Pericles* follows Gower considerably more closely than Twine in its use of frequently imitative prosody and diction, characters' names, Gower as Chorus, and plot. Signifi-
cantly, Acts III-V, and Act IV in particular, rely considerably more heavily on Twine than do Acts I-II, even though Gower remains the major source for the last three acts as well. The heavier reliance on Twine in Acts III-V indicates a difference in authorship between Acts I-II and Acts III-V, as I shall argue later.

The prosody and diction in Pericles echo Gower most closely in the numerous rhetorical set-pieces scattered throughout the play. These include the first two choruses, which open each act; the riddle (I.i.64-71); the letter placed in Thaisa’s coffin (III.ii.68-75); and the first half of Marina’s epitaph (IV.iv.34-38). A comparison of two of these passages, one occurring near the beginning of the play, the other near the end, with the corresponding sections in Gower and Twine demonstrate their imitative closeness to Gower in both prosody and diction. The riddle in Pericles is clearly adapted from its counterpart in Gower, which reads:

```
    With felonie I am up bore,
    I ete, and have it not forlore
    My moders flesshe, whose husbonde
    My fader for to seche I fonde,
    Which is the sonne eke of my wife
    Herof I am inquisitife.
  (Gower, 11. 413-18)
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In Pericles the riddle reads:

```
I am no Viper, yet I feed
On mothers flesh which did me breed:
I sought a Husband, in which labour
I found that kindnesse in a Father;
Hee's Father, Sonne, and Husband milde;
I, Mother, Wife; and yet his Childe:
How they may be, and yet in two,
As you will liue resolue it you.
(I.i.64-71)
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The octosyllabic couplets, the images of eating, searching, and finding, and the riddled naming of closest kin echo the riddle in Gower. By contrast, the riddle in Twine reads: “I am carried with mischiefe, I eate my mothers fleshe: I seeke my brother my mothers husband and I can not find him” (p. 428).

Marina’s epitaph in Act IV also imitates Gower. The epitaph in Gower appears as follows:
... O yet that this beholde,
Lo here lieth she, the whiche was holde
The fairest, and the floure of all,
Whose name Thaisis men call.
The kynge of Tyre Appolinus
Hir father was, now lieth she thus.
Fourtene yere she was of age,
Whan deth hir toke to his viage.

(11. 1541-18)

Similarly, the first part of the epitaph in Pericles reads:

The fairest, sweetest, and best lyes heere,
Who withered in her spring of yeare:
She was of Tyrus the Kings daughter,
On whom fowle death hath made his slaughter.
Marina was shee call’d. . . .

(IV.iv.33-37)

(The rest of the Epitaph in Pericles (11. 37-42), unfortunately, is hopelessly corrupt.) Entirely dissimilar to its counterparts in Gower and Pericles is the matter-of-fact epitaph in Twine: “Unto the virgin Tharsia in lieu of her fathers benefites, the Citizens of Tharsus have erected this monument” (p. 455).

Although some of the names in Pericles are the same or similar to those in both Gower and Twine, such as Antiochus, Thaliard (Thaliart in Gower; Thaliarchus in Twine), Dionyza (Dionyse in Gower; Dionisiades in Twine), and Cerimon, more of them are taken from Gower than from Twine. Names in Pericles taken from Gower include Helicanus (Hellicanus in Gower; Elinatus, Appollonius’ servant, is as close as Twine comes to the name or the character Helicanus), Lychorida (Lichorida in Gower; Ligozides in Twine), Thaisa (the daughter in Gower; Lucina in Twine), and Leonine (in Gower Leonin is the master bawd; in Twine he is unnamed).9 The place names in all three are much the same except for Mytilene (in Pericles and Gower), the setting for the brothel scenes; Twine calls the city Machilenta.

The most significant mark of the considerable indebtedness of Pericles to Gower’s Confessio is the use of Gower himself as Presenter, whose spirit has been resurrected to explain, describe, and moralize over events in the play. The choruses embody the spirit of Gower’s narrative both literally and figuratively. In his role as Presenter, Gower delivers eight choruses, ranging in length from his Epilogue of eighteen lines to the sixty-line
description of Pericles' reversed fortunes which opens Act III. Moreover, the eight choruses occur at strategic points throughout Pericles: each opens a different adventure. The Prologue prepares for Pericles' arrival in Antioch (I.Ch.1-42). The next two choruses announce Pericles' arrival at Pentapolis (II.Ch.1-40) and describe his departure with his wife Thaisa and the subsequent storm during which Thaisa seemingly loses her life (III.Ch.1-60). In the choruses contained in Act IV, Gower gives accounts of Marina's growing up in Tharsus and her present danger (IV.Ch.1-52) and Pericles' return to Tharsus, where he learns of Marina's supposed death (IV.iv.1-54). The last three choruses contain descriptions of Pericles and Marina's meeting at Mytilene (V.Ch.1-24), their arrival at Ephesus (V.ii.1-20), and the Epilogue.10

Major uses in Act I of Gower's plot and sequence of events include Pericles' arrival at Antioch, his risking his life for Antiochus' daughter's hand, the riddle he is posed, his reaction to the riddle, his flight to Tyre, and Antiochus' hiring Thaliard to murder Pericles (Gower, 11. 382-519). The melancholy soliloquy that Pericles delivers on his return to Tyre (I.ii.1-33) echoes Gower closely (11. 451-73); scene iv, which takes place in Tharsus, also follows Gower in placing Pericles' relief of famine-ridden Tharsus before he learns that Antiochus still seeks to kill him (Gower, 11. 561-92; cf. Twine, pp. 430-33). Act II opens with the description of the warning given Pericles of his continuing danger from Antiochus (II.Ch.23-26), as in Gower (11. 579-92); but the act does not follow Gower (or Twine) again until scene iv (11. 1-12). In scene iv Helicanus tells Escanes, a Tyrian lord, of the deaths of Antiochus and his daughter (Gower, 11. 1005-10); and, as in Gower, Pericles does not become king of Antioch (cf. Twine, p. 445). Most of scene v, in which Pericles and Thaisa pledge their love and agree to marry, follows Gower more closely than Twine (Gower, 11. 874-962; cf. Twine, pp. 441-44). Simonides' feigned resistance to the match was added by the dramatist.

Beyond doubt, then, Acts I-II are far more heavily indebted to Gower than to Twine in both plot and sequence of events. Even though the use of sources in Acts III-V is more complicated, the overall pattern can be summarized simply enough: Gower
remains the dominant source in Acts III-V; yet Twine is used to a much greater degree in the last three acts, especially Act IV, than in the first two acts.

Act III draws more heavily on Gower than on Twine for scene i, which contains the storm, Thaisa’s supposed death in childbirth, Pericles’ grief, and the casting overboard of Thaisa’s body (Gower, 11. 1045-1148; cf. Twine, pp. 446-47). Pericles is brought word of Thaisa’s death, as in Gower, whereas in Twine he remains with his wife throughout the storm and rejects at first the sailors’ demand that his wife’s body be thrown overboard. The scene at Ephesus (III.ii) relies on Gower instead of Twine for several important details. In Twine, Cerimon, who assumes that Lucina (Thaisa in *Pericles*) is dead, has her body placed on a funeral pyre, but Machaon, Cerimon’s young pupil, discovers signs of life in the lady and revives her (pp. 449-50). In *Pericles* and Gower, there is no Machaon, and Cerimon himself restores Thaisa to life (III.ii.78-95; Gower, 11. 1170-1209). Yet it is the businesslike and painstaking attitude of Cerimon’s young pupil described in Twine that is the source for Cerimon’s brisk but thorough bedside manner in *Pericles* (Twine, pp. 449-50; *Pericles*, III.ii.80-96; cf. Gower, 11. 1192-1209). The last two scenes in Act III, containing Pericles’ stopover at Tharsus, where he leaves Marina in the care of Cleon and Dionyza before returning to Tyre, and Thaisa’s decision in Ephesus to become a votaress of Diana follow Gower and Twine in equal measure (Gower, 11. 1227-1322; Twine, p. 450), even though the order of events in Gower and Twine is reversed in *Pericles* for dramatic effect.

Act IV, which is devoted to Marina’s trials in Tharsus and Mytilene and to her reunion with Pericles after their fourteen-year separation, continues the increased use of Twine begun in Act III, scene ii. Scenes i and iii take place at Tharsus and contain, respectively, Dionyza’s attempt on Marina’s life by means of her hired assassin Leonine and Cleon’s remonstrance to Dionyza for her part in Marina’s supposed murder. The chorus opening Act IV and the first half of scene i follow Gower (11. 1332-1405) and Twine (pp. 452-55) equally. But the second half of the scene (11. 50-103), containing Leonine’s attempt on Marina’s life, her rescue by pirates, and abduction, is closer to
Twine than Gower (Twine, pp. 453-54; cf. Gower, 11. 1381-1405); and scene iii, Cleon's horrified reaction to what he thinks is his wife's murder of Marina and Dionyza's cold-blooded response, follow Twine alone (Twine, pp. 454-55; cf. Gower, 11. 1506-20).

It is the brothel scenes (ii. v-vi) at Mytilene, however, that contain the most significant use of Twine. These three scenes rework and transform the corresponding episodes in Gower (11. 1418-84) and Twine (pp. 455-59) to a degree unmatched elsewhere in *Pericles*. Nevertheless, in their general plot outline and their level of dramatic tension, they are significantly closer to Twine than to Gower. In *Pericles*, as in Twine, Lysimachus, governor of Mytilene (Prince Athanagoras in Twine) comes to the brothel and attempts to buy the sexual favors of Marina only to be won over at last by her virtue. In Gower Lord Athenagoras has no part in the brothel episode. In fact, the entire episode in Gower is covered in one verse paragraph of sixty-six lines; however, in *Pericles* the three brothel scenes account for almost 400 lines of dialogue, and in Twine the two brothel chapters contain over 250 lines of prose. Finally, the deliberately exploited contrast between the modest chastity of Marina and the depraved language and conduct of the brothel inmates and the initially cynical attitude of Lysimachus are taken from Twine.

The increased use of Twine beginning in Act III, scene ii, which reaches its highest point in the brothel scenes in Act IV, points up the difference between Acts I-II and Acts III-V, not only in the proportionate amounts of Gower and Twine used, but also in the dramatic purpose behind their use. It is obvious that Twine was used more heavily than Gower in at least one important scene in Act III and in three key scenes in Act IV to achieve a degree of suspense and dramatic tension absent in Acts I-II. This suggests that Act III-V were created by a dramatic mind entirely different from the one (or ones) that produced Acts I-II.

Act V returns to Gower as the major source to soften and curtail a story often too violent and mercenary in Twine and always long-winded. For instance, Apollonius (*Pericles*) threatens in Twine's account to break the thighs of anyone who disturbs his solitude (p. 461); no such threat is mentioned in Gower or *Pericles*. In Twine Athanagoras (Lysimachus in *Pericles*) talks at
length to Apollonius, who answers him (pp. 462-63); but in
*Pericles*, as in Gower, Lysimachus' address to Pericles is met with
silence (V.i.39-41; Gower, 11. 1653-56). In Twine Tharsia
(Marina in *Pericles*) sings to Apollonius, who thanks her, gives
her gold, and asks her to leave; she returns to Athanagoras, who
promises her even more gold if she will return to Apollonius; she
agrees, rejoins Apollonius, and after a song and a series of riddles
tells him her story (pp. 464-67). In *Pericles*, as in Gower, Marina
talks and sings to Pericles gratis. Later, in anger, he rebuffs her
with either a shove or a slap. Finally, Marina and Pericles,
recounting their stories in a series of questions and answers,
recognize one another (V.i.85-215; Gower, 11. 1682-1743). The
account of the events in Machilenta (Mytilene) following the
reunion of father and daughter also is different in Twine (pp.
468-70), including Appollonius' execution of the bawd (pp.
469-70), which does not occur in Gower or *Pericles*. In V.iii,
Pericles and Marina arrive in Ephesus, where Thaisa faints on
discovering their identities, as in Gower (1. 1862); and, as in
Gower, a letter comes to tell of Simonides' death (V.iii.77-78;
Gower, 11. 1973-78). Pericles then gives Tyre to Lysimachus and
Marina and keeps Pentapolis for himself and Thaisa (V.iii.80-82;
Gower, 11. 1923-26, 1992-99) as the play moves swiftly to its
close. In contrast to Twine's four-chapter conclusion (pp.
474-82), Gower's eighteen-line Epilogue, based on the *Confessio*
(11. 1895-2000), rounds out the play with a combined
denouement and moral.

Thus, when *Pericles* is compared with its two chief sources,
Gower and Twine, two conclusions must be drawn: that Gower's
*Confessio*, not Twine's *Patterne of Painefull Adventures*, is
unquestionably the major source for *Pericles*, but that even
though Gower is the main source, Acts III-V contain significantly
more material from Twine than do Acts I-II and that Twine was
used in these sections to achieve a degree of suspense and
dramatic tension not found elsewhere in the play. The heavier
use of Twine in Acts III-V does not by itself prove that Acts I-II
and Acts III-V are the work of separate dramatists, but it does
support textual and stylistic evidence of a divided authorship in
*Pericles*.41
Although Shakespeare has a chorus figure in six other of his plays, none of the six, not even *Henry V*, contains such a pervasive chorus figure. Ancient Gower as chorus appears eight times in *Pericles* and speaks some 310 lines, only sixty less than the combined number of lines of Shakespeare's other six chorus figures. Throughout the play the function of the Gower choruses is to give continuity to the rambling, episodic story of the Prince of Tyre. Yet the choruses contain two markedly different styles of poetic construction. The two choruses in Acts I-II, written in octosyllabic couplets, deliberately evoke the prosody and language of Gower's *Confessio* and are totally in harmony with the medieval temper and leisurely pace of the first two acts, which follow extremely closely the Apollonius story in Gower. The remaining six choruses, three written in octosyllabic couplets (III.Ch.1-60; IV.Ch.1-52; V.ii.1-20), two in pentameter couplets (IV.iv.1-54; V.Ch.1-24), and one in alternately rhymed pentameter couplets (Epilogue, 11.1-18), are more in keeping with the superior versification and dramaturgy of the last three acts. Through a comparison of the two choruses in Acts I-II with the six choruses in Acts III-V, I believe it is possible to present further internal evidence to support a divided authorship for *Pericles*: Shakespeare for Acts III-V and one or more unknown dramatists for Acts I-II.

Like much of the poetry in the first two acts, the two choruses in Acts I-II are singsong in their prosody and comparatively facile in their meaning. The following passage from the second chorus reflects the pace and tone of much of the verse in Acts I-II:

```
Heere haue you seene a mightie King,
His child I'wis to incest bring:
A better Prince, and benigne Lord,
That Will proue awfull both in deed and word:
Be quiet then, as men should bee,
Till he hath past necessitie . . .
(II.Ch.1-6)
```

The aural effect of the singsong cadence of octosyllabic couplets accented by heavily end-stopped lines is that of a deliberately monotonous chant; and the predominance of common, one-syllable word choices makes the diction plain and lackluster. The
verbal strength of the passage is marred further by the ineffectual filler “I’wis” and “as men should bee.” The obtrusive pentameter line (“That Will proue awfull both in deed and word”) is particularly inept but may be due, at least in part, to reportorial error.

In marked contrast to the excerpt above is a passage, in pentameter couplets, from one of the best later choruses:

Thus time we waste, & long leagues make short,  
Saile seas in Cockles, haue and wish but fort,  
Making to take our imagination,  
From bourne to bourne, region to region,  
By you being pardoned we commit no crime,  
To vse one language, in each seuerall clime,  
Where our sceanes seems to liue.

(IV.iv.1-7)

In these end-stopped couplets, monotonous cadence is replaced with the natural speech rhythms of pentameter lines reinforced by shifting caesuras. The less common word choices of one, two, and three syllables often arranged in alliterative and more imaginative phrases (long leagues, Saile seas in Cockles, bourne to bourne, each seuerall clime) illustrate the superior diction of this later chorus enhancing Gower’s metaphoric appeal to the audience to lose its imagination in following the far-flung journeys of Pericles.

Yet the former passage is in no way so inferior that it might be the result solely of poor reporting. On the contrary, the two choruses in Acts I-II reveal a poetic art and dramatic intention of their own, even though they lack the comparative sophistication of prosody and diction belonging to the six choruses in Acts III-V. This is nowhere clearer than in the consciously adopted style and content of Gower’s Prologue, in which the poet as Chorus appears before his audience in his dual role as author of the Confessio Amantis, the primary source for the play, and guide to this dramatic adaptation of his ancient story.

Gower begins his story of Apollonius in the Confessio thusly:

Of a cronike in daies gone,  
The which is cleped Panteone,  
In loves cause I rede thus,  
 Howe that the great Antiochus,  
 Of whom that Antioche toke  
 His firste name, as saith the boke,
Was coupled to a noble quene,
And had a daughter hem betwene.
But such fortune cam to honde,
That deth, which no kyng may withstond,
But every life it mote obey,
This worthy quene toke awey.

(Gower, 11. 279-90)

The opening chorus of *Pericles* evokes with deliberate care the prosody and mood of Gower's *Confessio* through the resurrected spirit of Gower, who appears on stage to deliver an incantatory prologue with himself as the first conjuration. The eye beholds the embodied poet, while the ear hears a chant in octosyllabic couplets simulating the cadence and narrative pace of the *Confessio*:

To sing a Song that old was sung,
From ashes, ancient Gower is come,
Assuming mans infirmities,
To glad your eare, and please your eyes.
It hath been sung at Feastyuals,
On Ember eues, and Holydayes:
And Lords and Ladyes in their hues,
Haue red it for restoratues:
The purchase is to make men glorious,
*Et bonum quo Antiquius eo melius*:
If you, borne in those latter times,
When Witts more ripe, accept my rimes:
And that to heare an old man sing,
May to your Wishes pleasure bring:
I life would wish, and that I might
Waste it for you, like Taper light.

(I.Ch.1-16)

In retelling the familiar old story, the dramatist points up the antiquity of the poet and his story through the imitative octosyllabic couplets and suggestively archaic diction of the Gower chorus. In addressing the audience in this manner, Gower's spirit is physically present, and at the same time, his chanting voice and quaint manner serve to distance the audience from the events in the play. Once his function as narrative guide and his leisurely pace are established, Gower sets the scene (“This Antioch, then Antiochus the great, / Buylt vp this Citie, for his chiefest Seat. . . .” [I.Ch.17-18]), gives background information (11. 21-40), and prepares the audience for the actors' entrance (“What now ensues, to the judgement of your eye, / I giue my cause, who best can justifie” [11. 41-42]). The function of the first
chorus is solely a narrative one, with Gower acting as narrator-usher between the audience and his ancient tale until the actors enter to portray the story dramatically.

Similarly, the chorus which opens Act II also is written in octosyllabic couplets with heavy end-stopping and serves an exclusively narrative function incorporating quaint diction and phrasing reminiscent of the Confessio. This is seen clearly enough in the conclusion of the second chorus:

. . . For now the Wind begins to blow,
Thunder aboue, and deepe below,
Makes such vnquiet, that the Shippe,
Should house him safe; is wrackt and split,
And he (good Prince) haung all lost,
By Waues, from coast to coast is tost:
All perisheil of man of pelfe,
Ne ought escapend but himselfe;
Till Fortune tir’d with doing bad,
Threw him a shore, to giue him glad:
And heere he comes: what shall be next,
Pardon old Gower, this long’s the text.

(II.Ch.29-40)

There would seem little doubt, then, that the first two choruses are alike in prosody and diction and that each deliberately echoes the Confessio. Such conscious imitation of the style of Gower’s verse narrative cannot be the work of a reporter; it must represent the work of one or more dramatists. Yet when the two narrative choruses in Acts I-II with their painstakingly imitative prosody and their simple, narrative thought patterns are compared to the six choruses in Acts III-V, the existence of a divided authorship in Pericles is evident.

Even though three of the six choruses in Acts III-V, like the two choruses in Acts I-II, are written predominantly in octosyllabic couplets and imitate the old-fashioned diction of Gower’s poem, they nevertheless demonstrate noticeably more complex syntax, imagery, and thought patterns. Consider, for example, this passage in octosyllabic couplets from the opening chorus in Act IV:

Hight Philoten: and it is said
For certaine in our storie, shee
Would euer with Marina bee.
Beet when they weaude the sleeded silke,
With fingers long, small, white as milke,
Or when she would with sharpe needle wound,
The Cambricke which she made more sound
By hurting it . . .

(IV.Ch.17-25)

Because the rhymed couplets in the passage are not consistently end-stopped, the verse is more flowing and less monotonous in its aural effect than in either of the two choruses in Acts I-II. Even with the deliberate archaism ("Hight") and the conventional poetic diction ("the sleded silke," "fingers long, small, white as milke"), the language, too, is more graceful, and the image (of deft and womanly craftsmanship) is syntactically more complex and extended. The irregular lines, "With fingers long, small, white as milke, / Or when she would with sharpe needle wound," may be caused by a reportorial or compositor's error.

In addition to the more openly structured prosody, graceful diction, and complex syntax of the three octosyllabic choruses in Acts III-V, the function of Gower as chorus is perceptibly different from his role in Acts I-II. Rather than appearing on stage solely to give an introductory summary of the dramatic action to follow, as he does in Acts I-II, in Acts III-V Shakespeare's Gower asks his audience to assist with its imagination the action on stage, as he does in this octosyllabic chorus which opens Act III:

And what ensues in this fell storme,
Shall for it selfe, it selfe performe:
I nill relate, action may
Conueniently the rest conuay;
Which might not? what by me is told,
In your imagination hold:
This Stage, the Ship, vpon whose Decke
The seas tost Pericles appeares to speake.

(III.Ch.53-60)

The third chorus in octosyllabic couplets occurs towards the end of the play. It, too, contains the direct appeal to the audience characteristic of the choruses in Acts III-V:

Now our sands are almost run,
More a little, and then dum.
This my last Boone giue mee,
For such kindnesse must reliue mee:
That you aptly will suppose,
What pageantry, what feats, what showes,
What minstrelsie, and prettie din,
The Regent made in Metalin.

(V.ii.1-8)
Thus, even though three of the six choruses in Acts III-V are written in octosyllabic couplets and simulate the language of Gower’s *Confessio*, they are clearly more skillful in diction, syntax, and imagery than the two choruses in Acts I-II. Moreover, in Acts III-V the function of the Gower choruses shifts from the solely narrative one of Acts I-II to one, strikingly more dramatic, in which Gower both narrates and actively urges the audience to assist with its imagination the action about to take place on stage.

The three pentameter choruses in Acts III-V are even more distinct from the two choruses in Acts I-II. These three choruses replace octosyllabic couplets with pentameter couplets (IV.iv; V.Ch.) and interlocking pentameter lines (Epilogue), and the imagery is more imaginative and original. These differences can be demonstrated in a passage taken from the chorus describing Pericles’ arrival at Tharsus and his grief on being told by perfidious Dionyza and Cleon of the supposed murder of Marina:

> See how beleefe may suffer by fowle showe,
> This borrowed passion stands for true olde woe:
> And *Pericles* in sorrowe all deuour’d,
> With sighes shot through, and biggest
tears ore-showr’d.
> Leaues *Tharsus*, and againe imbarques, heesweares
> Neuer to wash his face, nor cut his hayres:
> Hee put on sack-cloth, and to Sea he beares,
> A Tempest which his mortall vessell teares.
> And yet hee rydes it out. . . .

*(IV.iv.23-31)*

The diction and syntax contained in the lines, “And *Pericles* in sorrowe all deuour’d, / With sighes shot through, and biggest tears ore-showr’d. / Leaues *Tharsus*, and againe imbarques,” and the imagery of, “he beares, / A Tempest which his mortall vessell teares. / And yet he rydes it out,” are (the punctuation errors notwithstanding) characteristic of the pentameter choruses in Acts III-V and superior to anything in the two choruses in Acts I-II.

In two pentameter choruses, as in the three octosyllabic choruses in Acts III-V, Gower combines narrative with appeals that the audience use its imagination to assist dramatic action. Understandably, Gower makes no such appeal in the third
pentameter chorus, the Epilogue. In the chorus which opens Act V, for instance, Gower asks that his audience turn its thoughts to Pericles and

Suppose him now at Anchor: the Citie striu'de
God Neptunes Annuatl feast to keepe, from whence
Lysimachus our Tyrian Shippe espies,
His banners Sable, trim'd with rich expence,
And to him in his Barge with former hyes,
In your supposing once more put your sight,
Of heauy Pericles, thinke this his Barke:
Where what is done in action, more if might
Shalbe discouer'd, please you sit and harke.

(11. 16-24)

Whereas in Acts I-II Gower's role as the resurrected narrator of this latter-day dramatic version of his own Apollonius story serves to distance both Gower and the play from the audience, in Acts III-V his direct and often lengthy appeals to the audience to assist with their imaginations the representation of places and events on stage change distance between audience and actors to immediacy and urge on the audience a more actively imaginative participation in place of the passive mental reception expected in Acts I-II.

There are, then, two distinct differences between the two choruses in Acts I-II and the six choruses in Acts III-V: the prosody contained in both the octosyllabic choruses and the pentameter choruses in Acts III-V is superior to that of the two octosyllabic choruses in Acts I-II; and while Gower serves solely as a narrator in Acts I-II, in Acts III-V Gower both narrates and actively urges his audience to assist stage action with its imagination. It is therefore plausible, I think, that the differences between the choruses of Acts I-II and Acts III-V are the result of separate dramatists. Furthermore, because the more sophisticated prosody and the dual function of Gower in the six choruses in Acts III-V are entirely in keeping with the style and content of the last three acts of Pericles, they must be considered an integral part of the section written by Shakespeare. But the comparatively inferior style of the first two choruses, like the stylistically inferior acts that go with them, indicates that Acts I-II were written by someone other than Shakespeare.
When used to support existing textual evidence, the stylistic evidence offered by a comparison of the prosody and function of the Gower-figure in the eight choruses and the fact that each section of the play uses to a different degree and for a different dramatic purpose Gower and Twine as sources strengthen the case for a divided authorship of *Pericles*: one or more unknown dramatists for Acts I-II and Shakespeare for Acts III-V.

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Notes


4 Bullough uses the 1954 edition for the text of the *Confessio* in Narrative and Dramatic Sources, VI, 375-423.

5 The 1607 edition incorrectly attributes the work to Thomas Twine, Laurence's brother. It is impossible to say which edition was used as the source for *Pericles*. Bullough uses the earlier edition for his text (VI, 423-82).

6 Maxwell, p. xi; Hoeniger, p. xiv; Klebs, pp. 474-75; and Bullough, VI, 355. For their separate examinations of the question of indebtedness, see Maxwell, "Notes," p. 102 et passim; Hoeniger, pp. xiv-xvi; Klebs, pp. 474-81; and Bullough, VI, 355-69.


8 Citations from Gower's *Confessio* and Twine's *Patterne of Painefull Adventures* are taken from Bullough's texts (VI, 375-423 and 423-82, respectively).

9 The names "Pericles" and "Marina" have no known sources. For
speculations on their derivations, see Steevens' Introduction to Edmund Malone's Supplement to the Edition of Shakespeare's Plays Published in 1778 by Samuel Johnson and George Steevens, II (London, 1780), in which Steevens links Pericles with Pyrocles in Sidney's Arcadia; see also Kenneth Muir, "A Mexican Marina," English Studies, 39 (April, 1958), 74-75.

It must be kept in mind, of course, that the act and scene divisions added to later editions were not an original part of Pericles. Greg, whose text I follow, supplies act and scene divisions based on the Globe edition.

Apollonius slaps Thaisa in Gower (11. 1701-02). According to Twine's version, however, "... Apollonius fell in a rage, and forgetting all courtesie . . . rose up sodainly, and stroke the maiden on the face with his foote, so that shee fell to the ground, and the bloud gushed plentifully out of her cheekes" (pp. 466-67).

In addition to the Gower choruses in Pericles, there are chorus figures in Romeo and Juliet, 2 Henry IV, Henry V, Troilus and Cressida, The Winter's Tale, and Henry VIII.
Contention about Fortinbras and his role in Shakespeare's *Hamlet* may seem at first, like his own foray into Poland (IV.iv), an exposure hardly worth the effort. Surely here is one forthright figure in an endlessly ambiguous play. Reading *Hamlet* and relevant commentary, however, or seeing the play performed, may well suggest that significant questions are linked to Fortinbras. He speaks but twenty-three lines in the full text, is important in only five or six scenes, and actually appears in only two. But his warlike threats account for the atmosphere of siege at the beginning, and, as the new king presumptive, he has quite literally the last word. In the end he is ironically victorious over his former enemy, but without military effort. Apart from these and other facts given in the text of *Hamlet* itself, three general problems need to be addressed. The first is that of sources, and involves us in questions related to Fortinbras' name and claim to Denmark, the question of "electing" kings, and certain tangential ambiguities. The second is that of Fortinbras' nature and role, and includes consideration of his function as a foil, his significance, in the resolution, and other particular readings, that have been ventured. The third problem relates to questions essentially dramatic, and leads us to deal however cursorily with stage history, and with questions of casting and cutting. Our conclusions focus, in addition, on the larger disagreement over whether the presence of Fortinbras lends an important element of dramatic and thematic unity to *Hamlet*, or is rather a bothersome "excrescence."

The facts about Fortinbras, "Prince of Norway," can be briefly put down. He is the son of the elder Fortinbras of Norway, whom Hamlet's father once slew in single combat. As the play opens he has "Sharked up a list of lawless resolutes" in an attempt to recover lands lost by wager to Denmark at his father's death (I.i.60-64, 80-104). After Claudius sends ambassadors to negotiate (I.ii.17-41), Fortinbras gains a reprimand from his uncle, Norway the king, and a princely endowment as well when
he decides to wage war on Poland rather than Denmark (II.ii.61-79). Later, as agreed by negotiation, Fortinbras and “twenty thousand men” or more cross Denmark on their way to attack “some part of Poland” in hopes of gaining “a little patch of ground/That hath in it no profit but the name”—moving Hamlet to soliloquy (IV.iv.1-66). In the graveyard scene, the date of Fortinbras’ father’s death is said to have been that of Hamlet’s own birth (V.i.155-64), indicating that young Fortinbras, unless a posthumous child, is older than Hamlet, and was probably orphaned at a young age. Finally, after a martial signal from offstage, the moribund Hamlet predicts that “the election lights/On Fortinbras,” and gives him his “dying voice,” just before Fortinbras himself enters to survey the unseemly battlefield, comment on the carnage, arrange for the disposition of the bodies, accept his role as designated king, and order a soldier’s funeral for the dead prince (V.ii.360-414).

In his two scenes onstage Fortinbras has only a limited chance to reveal his nature, and thus our understanding of him comes partly from others, and from extrapolations. Marcellus’ phrase “Of unimproved mettle hot and full” (I.i.96), which Dr. Johnson paraphrases as “full of spirit not regulated or guided by knowledge or experience,” is a tag for the Fortinbras of the early scenes. Voltimand’s report suggests that Fortinbras had taken advantage of Norway’s sickness and age and had deceived him, but that he obeyed the king’s orders when reprimanded, is not averse to pragmatic compromise, and is perhaps more interested in waging war that in its particular object (II.ii.59-76), though our lack of knowledge about the Norway situation makes inferences about Fortinbras’ actions difficult. Hamlet, who never sees Fortinbras but closely misses him twice, calls him “a delicate and tender Prince” in whom “divine ambition” prompts heedless action, and implies that the attack on Poland is a matter of “honor” (IV.iv.48-56); quite possibly, however, Hamlet’s comments tell us more about himself than about Fortinbras. Only in the final entrance, full of military pomp, do we have a clear, if brief, view. Here Fortinbras is not only straightforward and commanding, but also compassionate and modest in asserting “some rights of memory in this kingdom”
The play, then implies Fortinbras' maturation but does not show us its stages or modes.

The origins of Fortinbras are obscure, but it seems that this character is "a distinctively English . . . addition." The elder Fortinbras, however, it clearly a development of the "Koll, King of Norway," who is slain by Horwendil in the Saxo Grammaticus source, and of the "Collere king of Norway," slain by Horuendile, in Belleforest. William W. Lawrence believes that Kyd probably introduced the younger Fortinbras in the lost Ur-Hamlet, but that Shakespeare may have rearranged the material for dramatic purposes. W. Teignmouth Shore says that "all the Fortinbras affair is doubtless the old play, which Shakespeare did not bother to omit." Keith Brown argues that both Starcatherus ("the strong one in battle") of Saxo and a Danish Duke Magnus, whom Shakespeare would probably have known about and whose exploits parallel to some degree Fortinbras' attack on Poland, are probably antecedents for Shakespeare's character.

The name, whether Shakespeare's or not, is rich in appropriate connotation. The spelling "Fortenbrasse" in Q1 and Q2 clearly calls for an anglicized and not a Norman pronunciation (as is sometimes heard). "Fortinbras" is usually said to translate as "Armstrong" or "Strong-in-the-arm," and this is clearly the dominant import of the name. Since bras suggests not only "arm" but "force" or "puissance" and (as in English) "arms" in the sense of weaponry, the name is, in effect, a compound and reduplicating epithet with an unmistakable implication.

Critics and readers have puzzled over the question of Fortinbras' "rights of memory" in Denmark, and this matter is complicated further by the problematic notion of an elective monarchy. Kittredge has concluded "that Fortinbras is related to the Danish royal family," but Lawrence finds that this and other "pseudo-historical" matters in the play are left "somewhat obscure." As for election—a matter relevant to Hamlet and Claudius as well as Fortinbras—Saxo and Belleforest are explicit, the latter noting that "tous d'un consentment le [Amlethus] declarederent Roy," but it may be that election was "reserved to princes of royal blood." J. Dover Wilson concludes that "Shakespeare did not intend to represent the Danish monarchy as
truly elective, but if he did, it makes no difference," and A. P. Stabler agrees. In any case, the ending of Hamlet leaves little doubt that Fortinbras is to be king, and his claim seems to be strengthened by Norway's prior claim on at least some of Denmark—those unspecified lands lost by Old Fortinbras in his last wager (I.i.86-95). Brown finds that "the play gives a slight impression that Fortinbras is Old Norway's heir . . . , so that . . . at the play's end one has a slight sense of the two kingdoms coming together." Though some see the notion of an elected king as an "undigested" element from the sources, or as merely a "splash of local color," it seems clearly important as a means of arranging an orderly means for Fortinbras to gain the Danish throne, given the fact that the old royal line is ended.

Discussions of Fortinbras' nature and role have hardly been so extensive as those dealing with Hamlet himself, but a large if scattered body of commentary, with some interesting divergences, has accumulated. Much, perhaps most, has focused on Fortinbras' obvious role as foil to Hamlet, following Hamlet's own musing (IV.iv.32-66), which emphasize the contrast between the self-assured and bellicose Norwegian and himself, with his scruples and caution. This soliloquy, echoing that in which he berates himself for lacking the player's capacity for action, has encouraged reading the prince as inactive and dilatory, and conversely has encouraged reading Fortinbras as an active and forthright Renaissance ideal of the sort his name implies. Goethe is one who emphasizes the "strenuous action" of the Norwegian scenes and their contrast with the paralyzed Danish court which Hamlet epitomizes. Mallarmé notes that Fortinbras, in general, is placed "comme contraste a l'hésitant . . . ." Fortinbras has been called a man of "uncomplicated forthrightness"; a "sufficiently practical man"; a "redoubtable" man of "energy and valor"; and the "ideal combination of thinker and man of action." Lily B. Campbell sees Fortinbras as one whose grief (at the loss of his father) is "dominated by reason," while Hamlet's is "excessive grief leading to destruction." Other critics, however, have questioned the idea that as a foil to Hamlet Fortinbras represents an ideal. David Bevington finds him "a more positive figure" than Ophelia, but wonders whether his petty quarrelsomeness is indeed wise counsel. A. J. A.
Waldock asks rhetorically, "Do we really think that Hamlet ought to be like Fortinbras?" And G. K. Hunter notes that Fortinbras' "range of abilities is bound to seem shallow and opportunist" in a context where "individual self-scrutiny" is the really heroic act.

Despite differences, the "curious parallelism" which Bradley and many others see between Fortinbras and Hamlet is insistent: "Fortinbras, like Hamlet, is the son of a king, lately dead, and succeeded by his brother." Fortinbras' motive, like Hamlet's and Laertes', seems to be at least partly that of avenging his father's death. Ernest Jones notes that the "entire Fortinbras situation," like Hamlet's, echoes a broadly recurrent myth in which the rival father is replaced by the young hero, but "actual fratricide" is repressed. M. M. Mahood remarks that, after Hamlet leaves for England—partly spurred by the example of Fortinbras—their actions are "exactly" parallel, for each "assumes, without a moment's misgiving, the authority of his dead father."

Fortinbras' important function in the closing scene of Hamlet has been much discussed, and anyone familiar with Shakespeare recognizes the motif of orderly succession and civil stability, ideas that Fortinbras seems to represent. J. R. Brown finds that the entrance of Fortinbras opens up the scene, and that "Elsinore is no longer a restricted and threatened enclosure." Mallarmé emphasizes, too, the fact that his final appearance represents a return to ordinary, everyday life. Roy Walker suggests that Fortinbras brings in a "new order" that contrasts with "the corruption of Elsinore." Francis Ferguson argues that "the role of Fortinbras, though . . . economically developed, is of major importance" as a symbolic spiritual rebirth, and that he returns us "to the wider mystery of life in the world at large." William Empson reminds us that Fortinbras averts the danger of civil war and calms the mob unrest that is mentioned several times in the play. Francis Berry reads the play in didactic terms, and is too effusive in praising Fortinbras: a "splendid youth, lucky and swift in action, high spirited, and with no speculative energy to drain away effectiveness." As he enters at the last, Berry says, Fortinbras is "triumphant and glowing, a golden figure," with "a warrior's instincts," who does not "hesitate a moment to accept
the responsibilities of kingship. In the end Fortinbras "is now the hero of the play," and he demonstrates "Shakespeare's loving admiration for the young man of martial skill and valour." He "is in harmony with himself and with all other persons about him," and though "Hamlet has ten times the brains and sensitivity of Fortinbras," the play shows us "the truth that it is the men of Fortinbras' type who have brilliant and successful careers in society," while such artist-figures as Hamlet are "practical failures."36 Bernard Grebanier suggests that finally "the world is . . . left in the capable hands of the good, and evil has perished . . . ."37

Other, more speculative views of Fortinbras have been suggested. Edward S. Le Comte voices the old theory that he was probably intended to represent James I,38 and others have noted that both in late Elizabethan England and the world of Hamlet there was indeed a "succession problem."39 One myopic critic given to allegory has even seen in the purposeful Fortinbras "a symbol of the rising middle class."40

However significant in the full text, Fortinbras in performance has frequently been cut entirely, or given a reduced role. Precedents for leaving out the mention or appearance of Fortinbras date from as early as 177641 and are numerous after 1814. The effect is both practical and dramatic. In practical terms, the cut eliminates "at least four speaking players—Fortinbras, Cornelius, Voltimand, and the Captain"—not to mention his 20,000 troops. Dramatically, it focuses the play more sharply on Hamlet's problem but eliminates an important "element of contrast," deletes an important soliloquy, loses a sense of Claudius as successful diplomat, and of course cuts out "the peaceful passing on of power" we expect in the tragedies.42 Recently The New Shakespeare Company, in the October performance of Hamlet at The University of Mississippi, ditched Fortinbras entirely, but compromised by keeping the early references to him and by staging the final scene so that members of the court paid allegiance (with a Nazi salute!) to his offstage presence, sanctioned by Hamlet's dying words, as Horatio's speech closed the action.

One obvious general problem is that the role of Fortinbras, though decidedly minor by most standards, calls for an actor of
great ability who can command the stage. This fact was borne out in a professional performance I saw at McCarter Theater at Princeton in 1960, one almost ruined by a Fortinbras whom no upper stage, nor trumpets, nor yards of vivid banners spectacularly unfurled, could make viable. With such a spindle-shanked ruler, Denmark, I knew, even untutored as I was, was not yet out of the weeds.

Though critics such as Bradley have argued for the organic, thematic, and dramatic importance of Fortinbras, others contend that he is a badly assimilated leftover from Shakespeare's sources. Granville-Barker thinks that Shakespeare "stretched probability in bringing Fortinbras to the suburbs of Elsinore" and, with the Norway business, generally disrupts a concentration that otherwise comes close to an effective unity of place. Roderich Benedix finds the Fortinbras elements a "gross fault" of composition, arguing that the duration of the diplomatic mission to Norway and of Fortinbras' meanderings makes Hamlet's extended inaction an implausible mystery. Given the inordinate length of Hamlet, it is no wonder that the Fortinbras elements have sometimes been abbreviated or dropped altogether, for that approach does indeed tighten, simplify, and focus the play.

Without Fortinbras, however, Hamlet would clearly lose, if only some of that "variety"—the "various forms of life and particular modes of conversation"—that Dr. Johnson found admirable. Like the larger problems, the questions related to Fortinbras may even add to the play's appeal. In one sense Fortinbras is two-dimensional and not complicated; but to the extent that he is problematic, the problems are not finally reducible to neat solutions. Whatever the route by which he came into the story, and whatever view of his role one finds most satisfying, clearly he is a sympathetic character fully enough delineated to work, if well played. Hamlet's approbative judgment of Fortinbras (IV.iv), though "sometimes taken to be mock-heroic," is surely "one that would have been taken seriously by an Elizabethan audience," and Fortinbras' dramatic functions seem indisputable—to heighten the main character's attributes and to give the play a suitable close. At the last Fortinbras accords Prince Hamlet the military funeral that
the elder Hamlet, according to the Saxo source, once gave Fortinbras' vanquished father, and there is a nice irony, if not poetic justice, in that. It is interesting to wonder if the sketchy figure of Fortinbras may have interested the author enough to suggest the full portrait in Othello—the next play—of a military man surely kin to him, one short on timely introspection, long on action. In Othello, critic Berry notwithstanding, we see the tragic implications in the character of such a rash man; in Hamlet, only his strengths are important.

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Notes

1References to Hamlet, given parenthetically, are to Shakespeare: The Complete Works, ed. G. B. Harrison (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1968), pp. 885ff. There seem to be no textual problems that significantly affect a reading of Fortinbras' role in the play. For a discussion of minor textual details, see B. A. P. Van Dam, The Text of Shakespeare's "Hamlet" (London: John Lane, 1924), especially Chpts. 2, 3, and 4. Fortinbras' spoken lines are all metrical; there are some minor variations in the placement or content of the stage directions in V.ii attendant on Fortinbras' arrival; and Van Dam prefers a text of Fortinbras' final speech which uses "Go, bid the soldiers shoot" to complete the short 1.411, and which ends the speech and play with ". . . here shows much amiss." Harrison's version reads

The soldiers' music and the rites of war
Speak loudly for him.
Take up the bodies. Such a sight as this
Becomes the field, but here shows much amiss.
Go, bid the soldiers shoot.

This reading results in two irregular lines, and circumvents the couplet close, but seems dramatically more emphatic.


4William W. Lawrence, "Hamlet and Fortinbras," PMLA, 61, No. 3(Sept. 1946), 673.

5See "Extracts from the Sources," including portions of Saxo Grammaticus'

*“Hamlet and Fortinbras,”* pp. 681, 683.


*“Polonius, and Fortinbras (and Hamlet?),”* English Studies, 55, No. 3 (June 1974), 235-36.


*Dict. Alphabet et Analog. de la Langue Francaise: Les Mots et Les Association D’Idées* (Paris: Société du Nouveau Littre, 1966), items “fort” and “bras.” Fort (adj.) is defined as “la force considérée en soi, comme une réserve de puissance,” and (adv. of quantity) as “excessivement, extrêmement.” Fort (1642, Ital. fortino), meaning petit fort (n.) or fortification, was perhaps not extant in Shakespeare’s time; brasse (12th c.), meaning a measure (“brace”), “longeur des deux bras étendus,” perhaps by some stretch suggests Fortinbras’ commanding posture in the final scene, but it is doubtful that this idea was intended. See also *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles,* 3rd ed. revised with addenda (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1947), for brass (OE braes), where Shakespeare’s use of the word to designate the alloy is cited: “Mens euill manners Hue in Brasse, their Virtues We write in Water.” See also *Dictionary of Obsolete and Provincial Words* (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1857), where fort is said to denote “strong, powerful,” and Brass, “impudence.”

*“Hamlet and Fortinbras,”* p. 686. Claudius calls Norway “our brother” when he meets the returning emissaries (II.ii.59), but this does not clearly indicate real kinship.


*Ibid.,* pp. 654-56. The quotation is Stabler’s paraphrase of Wilson’s position.

*“Polonius, and Fortinbras (and Hamlet?),”* pp. 236-37.

Stabler, p. 660. The suggestion about local color is Wilson’s.

*Cited in Francis Berry, “Young Fortinbras,”* Life and Letters, 52 (Feb. 1947), 94.

*“Hamlet et Fortinbras,”* in *Oeuvres Complètes* ([Paris]: Gallimard, 1945), p. 1564. In this brief essay is Mallarmé’s famous description of Hamlet “lisant au livre de lui-même. . . .” Mallarmé sees Fortinbras’ warlike behavior as no more destructive than that of Hamlet, the doubter whose presence spreads poison. This essay is discussed briefly by T. J. B. Spencer in “The Decline of Hamlet,” rpt. in Brown and Harris, p. 198.

*L. C. Knights, “Prince Hamlet,”* rpt. in *Discussion of “Hamlet,”* ed. J. C.


23 Cited and paraphrased in Morris Weitz, "Hamlet" and the Philosophy of Literary Criticism (Chicago: The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 84. Campbell's Shakespeare's Tragic Heroes: Slaves of Passion (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1930) has had many critics, as Weitz notes. Here Campbell forgets that Fortinbras' father, a man he probably knew little if at all, has been dead almost thirty years at the time of the present action in Hamlet, so that he might be expected to be less grieved than Hamlet, whose loss is fresh.


"Hamlet: A Study in Critical Method" (Cambridge: The University Press, 1931), cited in Sacks and Whan, p. 229. Waldock is one who thinks Hamlet, in praising Fortinbras (IV.iv), may also "see ironically through and through" this foil and "spur."

26 "The Heroism of Hamlet," rpt. in Brown and Harris, p. 96. Hunter concludes that Fortinbras "cannot be the hero of this play" (p. 95), and that "in the life of the play Fortinbras' efficient kind of heroism is fairly insignificant" (p. 96).

27 "Shakespeare's Tragic Period—Hamlet," in Levenson, p. 16. Bradley; of course, is wrong in saying Fortinbras' father is "lately dead." Bradley's discussion of Hamlet was accessible to me in bits and pieces excerpted by various editors (see note 20). See also Berry, p. 101.

28 This point is made by several critics, including Campbell, cited in Fredson Bowers, "Hamlet": An Outline-Guide to the Play (Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1965), pp. 106-07.


30 "Wordplay in Hamlet," from Shakespeare's Wordplay (London, 1957), rpt. in Levenson, p. 112. Mahood, like Bradley and Campbell, seems to suggest that Fortinbras' father's death is a recent event.


32 Oeuvres, p. 1564.

33 The Time is Out of Joint (London: Andrew Dakers, 1948), cited in Gottschalk, p. 122.


35 "Hamlet When New," The Sewanee Review, 41(1953), 15ff, in Levenson, p. 98. Empson notes that "the insistence on the danger of civil war . . . is rather heavy in the full text though nowadays often cut."

60
“Young Fortinbras,” pp. 101-03.

The Heart of “Hamlet,” p. 52.


Dover Wilson in particular. The parallels between Hamlet and Elizabethan England are explored in E. A. J. Honigmann, “The Politics in ‘Hamlet’ and ‘The World of the Play,’” rpt. in Brown and Harris, pp. 129ff; see especially pp. 134-35. Also see Grebanier, p. 106, where R. Rice, The Story of Hamlet and Horatio (London, 1924) is said to draw the Fortinbras-James parallel.

An unnamed “Marxist” lecturer, mentioned in Grebanier, p. 106. In this questionable scheme, “Hamlet’s indecision” is “a symbol of the decaying feudal order.”


Clark Glick, “Hamlet in the English Theatre—Acting Texts from Betterton (1676) to Olivier (1963),” Shakespeare Quarterly, 20, No. 1(Winter 1969), 22. See also Elinor Hughes, “John Gielgud a Modern and Unusually Interesting Hamlet,” Boston Herald (Oct. 18, 1936), rpt. in Sacks and Whan, pp. 114ff; “In recent years, only Walter Hampden has been willing to give Shakespeare’s play a fair chance, and even he omitted the short scene introducing Fortinbras and the soliloquy. . . .”

Berry, pp. 94, 103, notes that the part of Fortinbras is “often enough bestowed on a third or fourth rate actor, or . . . is doubled . . . ,” but that it calls for “an actor of fine physique, splendid voice, and professional excellence.” For a discussion of the staging of the two Fortinbras scenes at the Oregon Shakespearean Festival at Ashland, 1961, in the “best equipped strictly Elizabethan playhouse in the world,” see Herbert E. Childs, “On the Elizabethan Staging of Hamlet,” Shakespeare Quarterly, 13, No. 4(Autumn 1962), 469, 471.

“Place-Structure and Time-Structure,” from Prefaces to Shakespeare: “Hamlet” (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1965), rpt. in Bevington, pp. 24ff. Geographically Elsinore is on the way from Norway to Poland—at least in the real world—but one wonders why what is obviously a sea-journey would suddenly require that large numbers of troops march overland, as in IV.iv. Gottschalk, pp. 93-94, says that in general the psychoanalytic critics find unity in the play as written, while “the evolutionists—and particularly Robertson—” find such material as the Fortinbras episodes to be “’excrescences’ on the plot.”

Die Shakespearomanie (Stuttgart, 1873), in Sacks and Whan, pp. 3-4, Benedix, p. 7, asks, “What do we care, after Hamlet’s death . . . for Fortinbras? What is to us the succession to the throne in Denmark?”

Notes to Shakespeare, p. 181.

Peter Quennell and Hamish Johnson, Who’s Who in Shakespeare (New

"See The Cambridge History of English Literature, V. Part 1: The Drama to 1642 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1910), 227: "Othello "may very well have" come next after Hamlet in the sequence of composition.

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A PROBABLE PLATONIC ALLUSION AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN SHAKESPEARE'S JULIUS CAESAR
by John Alvis

In the second scene of Julius Caesar as Cassius and Brutus spar with each other over the question of Caesar, there occurs a series of peculiarly emphatic speeches upon the eye. Because they stand out from the context by virtue of their philosophical amplitude and complicated imagery, these passages on the function of eyes as mirrors invite a close scrutiny. They provide a first view of the workings of Brutus' mind, and this first view is very nearly definitive. I would suggest that the moral premises evident from Brutus' and Cassius' comments about the eye determine their subsequent conduct in the ensuing action and that by understanding this early exchange we may possess a key to the meaning of the play. We grasp the key fully when we recognize that the scene alludes to a Platonic dialogue which employs similar optical imagery for a similar thematic purpose. Although commentators on Julius Caesar have made nothing of this allusion, there are persuasive indications that it should be taken as a guide for assessing the tragedy of Brutus.

When to Cassius' complaint of scanted courtesies Brutus replies that he has been lately preoccupied with "Conceptions only proper to myself,"1 Cassius sees his opportunity for coming to the issue of Brutus' feelings toward Caesar. He opens with a rather ponderous rhetorical question, "Tell me, good Brutus, can you see your face?" Brutus in the heavily sententious and super-positive manner that becomes characteristic with him for the balance of the play, responds:

No Cassius; for the eye sees not itself
But by reflection, by some other things. (I.ii.52-53)

Cassius then claims it is generally lamented that Brutus lacks "mirrors" to reflect his worthiness and that many respectable Romans wish Brutus "had the eyes" to see the impending threat of tyranny. Cassius will himself serve as Brutus' "glass" reflecting his friend's virtue so that Brutus may truly see himself (I. ii. 304-319). For the remainder of the scene Cassius pretends to reflect public opinion about the relative merits of Caesar and

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Brutus. Cassius proposes to arouse in Brutus a desire to follow the example set by his putative ancestor, who liberated Rome from the Tarquin and founded the Republic. In a later soliloquy Cassius lets it be known that he actually fabricated the general opinion he claims merely to relate (I. ii. 312-317).

The sequence of speeches which established the motif of the eye as mirror follows closely the most crucial section of a conversation Plato records in *First Alcibiades*. The exchange involves Socrates and Alcibiades and deals with the advice of the Delphic inscription “See thyself” (*First Alcibiades* 132D-133C). Besides the striking verbal similarity of the speeches in the play to passages in the dialogue, another consideration makes it probable that Shakespeare had the Platonic text in mind when he composed the causerie at the beginning of *Julius Caesar*. In *Troilus and Cressida* Ulysses and Achilles deliver speeches which resemble those spoken by Cassius and Brutus:

ULYSSES: A strange fellow here  
Writes me that man, how dearly ever parted,  
How much in having, or without or in,  
Cannot make boast to have that which he hath,  
Nor feels not what he owes but by reflection;  
As when his virtues aiming upon others  
Heat them, and they retort that heat again  
To the first giver.

ACHILLES: This is not strange, Ulysses.  
The beauty that is borne here in the face  
The bearer knows not, but commends itself  
To others’ eyes; nor doth the eye itself,  
Not going from itself; but eye to eye opposed  
Salutes each other with each other’s form;  
For speculation turns not to itself  
Till it hath travelled and is married there  
Where it may see itself. This is not strange at all.  

(T & C; III.iii.96-111)

Several critics have suggested that these lines make reference to *First Alcibiades*. Ulysses’ first remarks read like a variation upon the eye analogy of the Platonic dialogue, and Achilles’ speech follows closely Socrates’ imagery. At another point in the play Shakespeare has Hector refer by name to Aristotle (II. ii. 166-167) and hence the anachronism of a Platonic allusion would not seem prohibitive. Moreover, there might be a certain appropriateness in allowing for an introduction of the other great philosopher of the classical world. If Shakespeare can quote
Aristotle in a play set several centuries before his birth he can also, perhaps should also, quote Plato.

The Platonic parallels introduced by Cassius and Brutus are more elaborate, more precise, and more significant than those appearing in Troilus and Cressida. The ostensible theme of both the Roman conversation and the philosophic text is self-knowledge, and in both cases understanding is imaged as a seeing of the self. Like Socrates, Cassius induces his interlocutor to admit that to scrutinize the self one must look at a reflected image. And, again like Socrates, Cassius secures agreement that the best mirror in which to view this reflection of self is another eye. Finally, both Socrates and Cassius are quite precise about the optical mechanics required for proper self-regarding. Socrates puts it as a question:

And have you observed that the face of the person who looks into another's eye is shown in the optic confronting him, as in a mirror, and we call this the pupil=doll, for in a sort it is an image of the person looking?

Cassius on the other hand makes a proposal and testimonial:

And since you know you cannot see yourself
So well as by reflection, I, your glass,
Will modestly discover to yourself
That of yourself which you yet know not of. (I.ii.67-70)

Yet here, just as they have been firmly established, the parallels end, and Cassius' instruction of Brutus begins to diverge remarkably from Socrates' education of Alcibiades. We might conclude that the closeness of Cassius' beginning to Socrates' beginning is calculated to emphasize the departures from the Platonic text which Shakespeare introduces in the sequel. For these differences lead us directly to the central issue of the play.

In First Alcibiades Socrates' optical imagery takes a somewhat curious turn after Alcibiades is brought to admit that self-knowledge can be achieved by viewing one's reflection in the eye of another. We might expect that Socrates would identify the other whose eyes serve as mirrors with some particular person or group of persons. However, he instead locates the proper mirror of the self in a part of the soul. The seat of the soul's knowledge of herself is ultimately, "this part of her [which] resembles God." And he concludes, "whoever looks at this, and comes to know
all that is divine, will gain thereby the best knowledge of himself" (133C). Self-knowledge, then, depends on a certain kind of introspection which directs the mind to a contemplation of God, that is, to a fixed and apparently transpolitical standard unconnected with the opinions of others. It does not seem that Socrates has in mind the eyes of any other person unless, perhaps, he may intend some other (the philosopher?) who already enjoys the vision of the divine. The character of Socrates' interlocutor probably accounts for this emphasis upon the transcendent, non-political source of the soul's measure. Alcibiades is a young man who desires public recognition above all else (105B-105B), who is preparing himself to win praise in an art (rhetoric) in which success depends upon public approval (105B-106C), and who is willing to take as moral guide the received opinions of the Athenian citizenry (108E-110E). Socrates attempts to moderate Alcibiades' dependence upon public opinion by suggesting that Alcibiades must look to some more universal standard if he intends to speak rightly about matters of justice and about politics. Although at the end Alcibiades appears to agree and resolves "to begin here and now to take pains over justice," Socrates is skeptical and expresses his doubt that Alcibiades will be able to withstand the lure of winning honors or the temptation of accepting the opinion of the many as his tyrant (135E). The Socratic dialogue thus concludes with a recognition of the great difficulties to be faced in overcoming the attractions invested in public approval.

*Julius Caesar* points to the same problem through Shakespeare's portrayal of Brutus' tragically misdirected venture in political rhetoric. I use the word *rhetoric* advisedly since it is apparent that Brutus' direction of the conspiracy and assassination demonstrates the priority of rhetorical considerations in his mind. Brutus makes every important decision according to his view of how the assassination should appear in the public eye, as if he were constructing a piece of spectacular rhetoric rather than directing a killing. Because he fears that executing Antony would make the enterprise "seem too bloody" (II. i. 162), Brutus, against Cassius' prudent suggestion, spares the one man who is capable of avenging Caesar's death; and for a similar reason Brutus compounds his error by permitting Antony's funeral,
oration. The two irredeemable mistakes which allow Antony and Octavius to conduct a successful revenge against the conspirators are caused by Brutus’ concern to give the assassination an honorable color. When their plans are first formed Brutus advises his fellow conspirators to imitate “our Roman actors” (II. i. 225-226). Immediately after Caesar’s death Shakespeare has Brutus speak of the assassination as a theme for future theatrical production (III. i. 114-16). The purpose of these theatrical contrivances is explicitly declared by Brutus in a speech which carries forward the controlling image of the eye:

This shall make
Our purpose necessary, and not envious;
Which so appearing to the common eyes,
We shall be called purgers, not murderers. (II.i.177-180)

Brutus is always aware of how his conduct appears to the common eye, and if his Forum speech proves inferior to Antony’s it is not, as some critics have maintained, because his mind is too noble to bend to rhetorical displays. Brutus simply underestimates Antony’s devotion, his persuasive power, and his advantage of speaking last to the malleable Roman populace. He may prove imprudent as a rhetor, but Brutus is only too preoccupied with putting the proper face on his questionable undertaking.

The consequences of Brutus’ admission that the eye sees not itself are revealed in his failure to deliberate responsibly upon the problem of Caesar. His orchard soliloquy shows Brutus’ inclination to follow the advice Cassius had offered two scenes earlier; and, one might add, his willingness to hover dangerously on the brink of self-deception. In the earlier scene Cassius has reversed the Socratic teaching by urging Brutus to take his bearings from the opinions others have of him. At that point Brutus shows some interest but stops short of committing himself to a plot against Caesar. However, the interval between the feast of Lupercal and the orchard scene has allowed Brutus to accumulate the anonymous petitions Cassius had promised to put in his way (I. ii. 312-316). These writings do more than anything else to confirm his rather shaky purpose. When Lucius interrupts his master’s private deliberations with a letter commanding him to “see thyself” (II. i. 46), Brutus moves quickly from the
tentative resolution of his first soliloquy where Caesar had been, at worst, a potential tyrant to his denunciation of an already ranging “high-sighted tyranny” less than a hundred lines later (II. i. 118). Most significantly, Cassius’ allusion to the ancestral republican liberator, which had failed to win Brutus’ assent at the beginning, this time appears under the aegis of a supposed general will. The note reads only:

'Brutus, thou sleep'st. Awake, and see thyself!  
Shall Rome, &c. Speak, strike, redress!' (II.i.46-47)

Brutus feels compelled to “piece it out” and, like Malvolio in a comic counterpart to this scene, he makes the enigmatic message say what he has already determined it should. He contrues the rhetorical question to mean “Shall Rome stand under one man’s awe?” The answer he thinks is apparent in the precedent of his ancestors who drove out Tarquin “when he was called a king” (II. i. 54). Brutus’ imagination thus provides him with authoritative public expectations and an authoritative model. Yet in drawing the historical parallel it leads him into a curious essay in revisionist history. Has Brutus forgot that Tarquin was expelled not because he was called a king (Rome had several kings before him), but because he was a tyrant? This suggests the question that a responsible statesman would be obligated to resolve before participating in any conspiracy: would Caesar’s kingship likely result in arbitrary rule? Brutus’ earlier thoughts clearly exonerate Caesar of present and probably of future tyranny, for as he admits, “the quarrel / Will bear no color for the thing he is” (II. i. 28-29). Nevertheless, having no other grounds than the mere possibility that kingship may lead to despotism, Brutus is prepared to kill Caesar once he has been induced to believe that others see him as an honored liberator. That is, he fervently adopts the role he perceives in the mirror of supposed public opinion. Moreover, once he has imagined himself in that role, deliberation about justice abruptly ceases. From this point on all thoughts are given over to the problem of making the conspiracy appear honorable to the common eye. Brutus moves from deliberation to rhetoric, not in response to the specific grievances Cassius urges against Caesar, for these are too obviously tainted by envy to appeal to Brutus’ loftier mind, but
in answer to what he conceives to be his own "public." The fabricated appeals create a larger if more nebulous body of opinion than that represented by Cassius or by the other individual conspirators. We notice furthermore that he will not even consent to speak of the plot to Cicero, the one man who might be thought to have a sort of philosophical independence from public pressures (II. i. 150-152). Consequently, although he remains cold to most of Cassius’ insinuations in the first conversation, Brutus espouses Cassius’ anti-Socratic position concerning the means to self-knowledge. He locates the mirror of the self not in a divine standard known by reason but in a social standard known through the communication of opinion. Hence Brutus resembles Alcibiades although, unlike Socrates’ pupil, he suffers the further disability of acting in response to a public will which is merely a fiction.

Like Alcibiades Brutus lives for public recognition. Such a pursuit runs the risk of degenerating into the mere cultivation of appearances. Some of his critics have felt that he narrowly avoids hypocrisy in the gestures he contrives to preserve his dignity through the last two acts of the play. However that may be, Brutus dies in the belief that he has performed his role in a becoming manner. He thus makes good his early declaration to Cassius:

Set honor in one eye and death i' th' other,
And I will look upon both indifferently;
For let the gods so speed me as I love
The name of honor more than I fear death. (I.ii.86-89)

Before Philippi he assures the doubting Octavius that he could not fall to a sword more honorable that that of Brutus (V. i. 57-60). At the moment of his death he not only experiences no regret over the failure of his political purpose but declares a moral victory. His last judgment upon his career is resoundingly self-congratulatory:

I shall have glory by this losing day
More than Octavius and Mark Anthony
By this vile conquest shall attain unto. (V.v.36-38)

These final words attest Brutus’ almost obsessive preoccupation with his honor, and they recall that earlier moment when he had looked beyond the ugly spectacle of Caesar’s death to future
times when the assassination would be re-enacted, presumably as a non-bloody sacrifice, to his own greater glory. Yet Brutus' prospective vision of honorable recognition obscures self-knowledge. His unsuccessful revolution has brought about civil turmoil and the mass proscriptions of Antony and Octavius rather than the "peace, freedom and liberty" he had earlier proclaimed. Brutus is himself primarily responsible for these evils because his endorsement was essential to the conception and his will the sole direction of the conspiracy. He cannot see this failure in statesmanship because he is aware only of his good intentions and of the good fame he believes he has achieved. The three crucial stations of his tragic career: his decision to conspire against Caesar, his execution of the killing, and his reflection upon his deed for the last time are thus marked by the same dilemma. Brutus is in each case prevented from perceiving justice by his concern to acquire prestige. His absorption in his public image frustrates self-knowledge. Or, to put it in the distinctive idiom of the play, the eye sees not itself when it depends on the reflection of other eyes.

According to Plutarch Brutus was known for his adherence to the principles of the Old Academy. That is, he considered himself a student of Plato in opposition to the skeptics who dominated the so-called New Academy. Shakespeare departs from his source by ignoring this philosophical allegiance and by depicting a man who recalls Socratic teaching by contrast rather than congruence. It is just possible that Shakespeare's tragedy of honor at the expense of statesmanship alludes to the most famous section of the best known Platonic dialogue. Socrates' allegory of political salvation requires that the philosophical statesman ascend from the untrustworthy cave of opinion to the certain light of the sun from which he must again descend equipped with a standard whereby he may better direct the life of the inhabitants of the cave. If Brutus knows the Socratic teaching, he fails to live by it. Instead he is content to conduct his version of statesmanship from within the cave, accepting its estimate of truth and seeking the approval of those confined there. However, this is not to suggest that Brutus could avert his tragedy only by rising to improbable philosophic heights. His situation requires honesty, prudence, and the capacity for careful deliberation upon
the problem of justice posed by Caesar’s ascendance. That he achieves only the first of these prerequisites accounts for both his pathos and his limited nobility. The First Alcibiades suggests a less improbable way of attaining the other requisite qualities, and for this reason as well as for the others I have already indicated, is the more probable allusion.

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Notes


2. As far as I have been able to determine scholars have no evidence of any English translations of Platonic dialogues by the sixteenth century except for the spurious Aziolochus (1592). However, we do know that Ficino had published his Latin translation of the complete Platonic canon in Florence in 1482 and that four editions of this work were published in France (1519, 1522, 1533, 1536). Another Latin translation, by Janus Cornarius (1561), and a separate edition of the First Alcibiades (Platonic Alcibiades primus; vel de natura hominis. Marcilio Ficino Interprete, Paris, 1560) are mentioned by H. N. Hillebrand in The New Variorum Troilus and Cressida. Hillebrand notes another possible means of access to the dialogue in John Stobaeus’ Loci communes sacri et profani sententiarum (1581) which “reprints in Greek and Latin considerable portions of the First Alcibiades, including the eye passage” (p. 411). I assume that either Shakespeare read one of these versions or that some other translation of First Alcibiades, now unknown to us, was available to him. The language of the dialogue is not difficult nor the vocabulary very extensive, so even if we credit Shakespeare with no Greek his “small Latine” might be sufficient to construe Ficino’s rendition. Information concerning the dissemination of Platonic texts in the Renaissance can be found in R. R. Bolgar, The Classical Heritage and Its Beneficiaries (New York: Harper & Row: 1964, originally published 1954), especially pp. 277-278, 369-370, 450-451, 520-521. See also J. E. Sandys, A History of Classical Scholarship, vol. II (New York: Harper reprint, 1958), p. 81, pp. 102-104; H. B. Lathrop, Translations from the Classics into English from Caxton to Chapman (Madison, Wisc.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1933), p. 308.

3. Harold N. Hillebrand and T. W. Baldwin devote a section of the New Variorum Troilus and Cressida to a discussion of the minor scholarly controversy which has arisen on this matter (pp. 411-415). The Platonic source was first suggested by R. G. White in 1886 and rediscovered by John Churton
Collins in 1903. Objections arose from several quarters, most notably from J. M. Robertson, *Montaigne and Shakespeare* (1909), who argued that the imagery and the speeches were more accessible to Shakespeare from Dolman's English translation of Cicero's *Tusculans* or from Montaigne. Baldwin favors the *Tusculan* plus Cicero's *De Republica* although he also suggests that Ulysses' entire argument could be construed as a Christian application of a Platonic commonplace" (p. 414). Most recently, L. C. Knights has accepted the Platonic allusion but without offering new evidence in its favor, *Some Shakespearean Themes* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 70.

Apparently only Robertson noted the parallel passage in *Julius Caesar*, and he did so merely to substantiate his claim that the eye-soul image was a contemporary commonplace. However, Robertson's examples of the eye similitude are drawn from works by Davies and Marston which appear later than the probable date of *Julius Caesar*, and the passage from Cicero's *Tusculans* contains no mention of the mirroring process which is most prominent both in Achilles' reply to Ulysses and Cassius' reply to Brutus. Moreover, I would argue that further parallels of action, motive, and thought reinforce the eye-mirror-soul nexus in *Julius Caesar*, if not in *Troilus and Cressida*. Mr. Grant Colvin has pointed out to me a third instance of eye confronting eye in *King John* (II. i. 496-503).


C: A remark by Allan Bloom defines precisely the problem of standards revealed in Brutus' soliloquy: "Brutus will not act out of self-love; he prides himself on acting contrary to the movements of his heart. But he will act according to the popular view of what is decent, not because he hopes to be popular, but because he has no other source of knowledge about what is decent." *Shakespeare's Politics*, with Harry V. Jaffa (New York: Basic Books, 1964), p. 95. On the whole I find Bloom's reading of the play consistent with my own although I question his belief that Brutus does not desire popularity. He is no demagogue, but he requires public approval.


E: See Plutarch's account of Brutus' education and philosophical convictions near the beginning of his *Life of Marcus Brutus*.
PROSPERO AND MIRANDA: THE DIALECTICS
OF CHANGE IN THE TEMPEST
by Joseph A. Longo

The evocative and imaginative ethos of *The Tempest* is
grounded in the counterpointing of two seemingly contradictory
worlds: one centers upon specific actions and setting chosen out
of the past, that of Prospero's Milan; the other is the temporal
and natural order of the present, the island and its conditions
governed by Prospero. Into the delineation of these two worlds
Shakespeare is careful to distinguish the action of *The Tempest* as
one in which the disposition of Milan, where concupiscible lusts
terminate in the successful rebellion against Prospero, will
directly relate to the actions and judgments of Prospero on the
island. Thus, many of the specific motives and effects of the past,
with its emphasis on the degenerate condition of man, will be
re-enacted in the present. This causal and symbolic relationship
will not cease until Prospero in his role as a benign Providential
minister makes clear to the various personae the nature of their
fallibility and pronounces his final judgment. In this latter role,
one made vivid in the epilogue, Prospero emerges as the
Christian narrator addressing his Christian audience. Although
Milan and the island are seen as corrupt and unstable (the
conscious sophisticated villainy of Antonio and the natural evil
of Caliban), motivated by the vanity of human wishes,
Shakespeare makes his audience discover, perhaps as he has now
firmly rediscovered, that such wickedness is part of the universal
lot of all who live. The action of *The Tempest* swings between
Shakespeare's interest in Prospero as man and as Providential
being; *The Tempest* may be regarded as an oblique educational
pilgrimage by the human Prospero, as well as the deliberate
testing of the various personae by Prospero *qua* Providence to
inculcate them with wisdom. Only by keeping these dual
concerns in mind can one understand the total world of the play,
constantly moving and changing toward the final impulse of
resignation, reconciliation, and natural sanctity.

The action of *The Tempest* has a double movement: the literal
narrative and the quest for understanding—from the fantasy of
the scene to the truth beneath it. The analogy is that between
physical movement and the non-spatial action of the mind, the

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experiences of the personae on the island and their developing inner life. Prospero reveals to the audience both the story and its new meanings as he learns it; The Tempest unfoldsthe enlarging of Prospero’s spirit from doing, through suffering, to understanding.² Shakespeare’s specific focus in this drama of the awakening mind is the conversion (metanoia) in Prospero from the virtue of justice to the more transcendent principle of charity.³ The efficient cause of Prospero’s involvement with past and present, Milan and the island, is Miranda; she is responsible for Prospero’s journey back to Milan—an action which indicates Prospero’s initiation and return into the tribe. Miranda assists in focusing and emphasizing Prospero’s redirected intentions from vengeance to forgiveness. Throughout The Tempest Shakespeare presents Miranda as an ideal, in spirit and in fact, and the play explores such an ideal and the reasons that it has not been followed. By analogy, The Tempest presents conflicts of the past (in Milan) which are to be re-enacted (on the island).⁴ Miranda’s appearance and role in scene two is the visible answer to many of the expectations which the opening storm scene has aroused in the audience. Such motifs as natural disorder, social division, and death are delicately balanced against the more lightly stated themes of Christian faith, “All lost, to prayers, to prayers! all lost” (I.1.51), and, as Gonzalo unconsciously implores, for a transcendent world: “Now would I give a thousand furlongs of sea for an acre of barren ground, long heath, broom, furze, anything. The wills above be done!” (I.i.64-66).⁵ Through this symbolic storm Shakespeare implies the moral meaning of spiritual growth: the appearance of Miranda immediately following this action will show its basis in love and faith.

With the miraculous realization of Gonzalo’s hope, the appearance of the island with its implied connotations of life through death, the first individual seen and heard is Miranda. Through her is seen the island with its potential for Edenic virtues—of Gonzalo’s Golden Age as a timeless pole of human experience.⁶ But the natural beauty of Miranda and of the island shortly fades, and Shakespeare makes a sharp break between the evanescent reality of the present to a more dream-like past. As Miranda notes, “‘Tis far off, / And rather like a dream than an assurance” (I.ii.44-45), and Prospero replies, “What seest thou
else / In the dark backward and abysm of time?" (49-50). The shift is from one symbol to another: from the island as a timeless goal of human moral effort to Milan as the post-lapsarian reality. The dichotomy between the two worlds is sharply stressed: it is the division between what Professor Kermode calls Nature and Art, between unrestrained will and perverted intellect and disciplined reason and faith.\(^7\) The vision of Miranda's past life is startlingly announced in the oracular pronouncement of Prospero:

\[
\text{The hour's now come;}
\]
\[
\text{The very minute bids thee ope thine ear;}
\]
\[
\text{Obey, and be attentive. (36-38)}
\]

Now we see that what was foreshadowed in the storm is presented in the succeeding flashback as a specific historic event: the multiple disruptions in nature caused by Antonio's rebellion and stimulated by Prospero's alienation and inordinate thirst for knowledge (I.ii.89ff.). One is made to see all that has occurred before in Milan in order to make its human imperfections more poignant in contrast to the Eden-like beauty of the island incarnate in Miranda.\(^8\) In this context, Miranda appears at the intersection of time past and present. Because of her questions, Prospero once again suffers the experience of his past. Also, the former treachery of Antonio will be re-enacted on the island; 'the immediate analogue of these past betrayals is Caliban, upon whom—as Miranda asserts—"any print of goodness wilt not take, / Being capable of all ill" (I.ii.354-5). One needs to recall that at the conclusion of The Tempest, Antonio, like Caliban, remains yet unredeemed, unregenerate, and morally intractable. Shakespeare takes up these past and present discords, and through Miranda the action moves inexorably to time future in the concluding harmony of the imminent marriage between Miranda and Ferdinand, as well as Prospero's decision to return to Milan.

It seems fairly obvious that Miranda is an idealized figure, yet she is delicately human. Associated with her are the traits of innocence, nobility of spirit, natural obedience, and love. Since Miranda, in effect, knows only the island, she reveals its essence in her being and her beliefs; she is the living emblem of the timeless earthy paradise of the island. Her unquestioning,
innocent obedience is the requisite which Prospero insists should precede her knowledge of herself. Miranda is submissive to the nature of the island and to Prospero, a psychological and emotional posture which occurs prior to understanding. That is, Miranda is the spirit of the unredeemed world of the island, its fulfillment and living epitome; but what she is unthinkingly aware of is not so much the world as living reality as the truth of her world—what the world could be if it were not perverted and destroyed by vicious human passions. To Miranda, therefore, obedience and innocence of faith are one. As an idealized being, she inevitably focuses attention, by contrast, on the human knowledge of good and evil. Her virtue, the moral life which manifests itself in Miranda's thoughts and actions, is seen primarily as feelings, particularly in all that she bids Prospero to see and do. She sees and feels with a directness associated with childhood, with its pantheistic "intimations of immortality." But for Prospero, this naive awareness is only one stage in the growth toward full wisdom. Perhaps as her comments on a "brave new world" reveal (V.i.181-184), she represents the intuitive moral will unenlightened by reason, of obedience without understanding.9 Led on by the spirit of Miranda, however, Prospero's desire for vengeance dissolves, for in her he sees the possibility of ideal beauty in the human community of Milan.

Miranda thus introduces a crucial movement of spirit which Prospero will ultimately acknowledge and follow. Playing a role similar to the suffering persons on the doomed ship, she acknowledges, "O, I have suffered / With those that I saw suffer/" (I.ii. 5-6). Miranda also helps to reveal to Prospero the significance of the "rarer action" of forgiveness. Prospero admonishes her, "Wipe thou thine eyes; have comfort. / The direful spectacle of the wrack, which touch'd / The very virtue of compassion in thee . . ." (24-26). After the bustle and confusion of the storm scene, Shakespeare stops the action for this interlude between Prospero and Miranda. Like Miranda, Prospero is to face the past, present, and end of his life. Not only is he to judge and redeem, but he too is to be judged by Miranda, and later by Ariel, and redeemed by the potent force of love. In this scene Prospero unfolds the truth of his own being, his culpable human
nature: “I, thus neglecting wordly ends, all dedicated / To
closeness and the bettering of my mind / . . . in my false brother /
Awak'd an evil nature” (I.ii.89-93). Donning his magic robes,
Prospero the mortal and Prospero the beneficent theurgist
become one: “I am ready now” (I.ii.187).

With her innocence, her painful and literal simplicity, Miranda
spares Prospero no humiliation. For Miranda, the storm and its
immediate continuum of events are an agonizing moment of
human experience without full understanding or perspective; for
Prospero the storm and the remembrance of time past recall irre­
sponsibility, cruelty, and savagery—his betrayal as well as those
of others. Thus, the suffering which Miranda shares with the
members of the unfortunate shipwreck becomes a synecdoche for
the major action of The Tempest. The central reflector of this
conflict is Prospero, who shares this suffering through a
recognition of his tortured past and its equivalent unfolding
action in the present action of the drama.

Scene two, consequently, marks a significant action in The
Tempest. As drama and as philosophy, it will correspond to
another climax in Prospero’s upward movement of spirit which
will lead to his renunciation of vengeance; the exchange between
Prospero and Ariel in the final rhythm of the play, culminating
in Prospero’s admission that “the rarer action is / In virtue than
in vengeance” (V.i.27-28). The opening and closing scenes of the
play are thus yoked by dramatic and thematic correspondences. The change of heart which Miranda is
insistent upon in Prospero in order to bring relief to the stricken
voyagers is effected in this final harmonizing scene:

Ari. Your charm so strongly works ‘em
   That if you now beheld them, your affections
   Would become tender.
Pros. Dost thou think so, spirit?
Ari. Mine would, sir, were I human.
Pros. And mine shall.
(V.i.17-20)

One must recall that this awareness of charity has been
immediately preceded by a view of Prospero in great anger. To
Miranda, Ferdinand declares in amazement, “This is strange:
your father’s in some passion / That works him strongly”
(IV.i.143-144), and Miranda, equally astonished, admits, “Never
till this day / Saw I him touch'd with anger, so distemper'd” (144-145). Momentarily separated from his painful memories of the past and the agonizing realities of the present, Prospero concentrates on the natural and spiritual felicities of the masques by Juno, Ceres, and Iris consecrating the imminent marriage of Miranda and Ferdinand. Suddenly Prospero awakens to recall “that foul conspiracy / Of the beast Caliban and his confederates / Against my life” (IV.i.139-141).

Prospero’s turn from the divine and pastoral materials of the masque is marked in these lines. The change is from the greater vision of harmony and goodness in human conduct actualized in the successful love-test of Ferdinand to Prospero’s lesser vision of the degeneracy of human nature. This moment corresponds to that interlude in scene two when Prospero sees Miranda and himself from a dual perspective: as isolated in the timeless present of the island but also rooted in their historical past. In these quasi-epiphanic “spots of time,” Prospero has a vision of life as it is and as it can be. In addition, Prospero recognizes his own humanity with its frailties and grandeurs. The stance through which Prospero concludes this episode in act four leads directly to his action of compassion in act five, finding its statement in the justly oft-quoted “our revels now are ended” speech (iv.i.148-163). As Thomas McFarland points out, the rhetoric and content of this passage illustrate Prospero’s understanding and acceptance of the paradoxical condition of human nature. As Prospero leads the personae of the island through the various tests and experiences by which he has planned to reveal his truths to them, Prospero is, by analogy, concurrently freeing himself of his past guilts. This recurring pattern of thought and emotion from the island to Milan, the dichotomy between the timeless innocence of the present and the treachery and violence of the past (linked in the analogical behaviour of Caliban and Antonio on the island), reopens old wounds and reawakens in Prospero his initial interest in punitive justice, “I will plague them all, / Even to roaring” (IV.i.192-193), in order to emphasize Prospero’s final Christian and humanistic posture of charity.

Unlike Prospero, Miranda and Ariel do not attain understanding but see only with the eye of the body, and then
emotionally. Prospero’s visions of truth are apprehended by the eye of the mind incorporating physical, intellectual, and spiritual truths. Because of Miranda and Ariel, nevertheless, Prospero faces his final reckoning for they force him to recall and reconcile his painful struggles. *The Tempest* is primarily the re-enactment of Prospero’s internal tempest, his psychic growth from the virtue of justice to the greater virtue of compassion—from the letter of the law to its spirit in much the same evolution as that of his prototype, the Duke of *Measure for Measure*. Both come to understand the significance of purgation, by analogy, through their knowledge of themselves and through their obedience to love rather than to vengeance. As Stephen asserts in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, “Pity is the feeling which arrests the mind in the presence of whatsoever is grave and constant in human sufferings and unites it with the human sufferer” (p. 239, Modern Library ed.). And Dante, akin to Shakespeare in many ways, is even more direct and eloquent on this point:

> Quinci comprender puoi ch’esser conviene  
> Amor sementa in voi d’ogni virtute  
> E d’ogni perazion che merta pene.  
> (“Purgatorio,” *Commedia*, xvii, 103-105)

The central action of *The Tempest* may be thought of as a traditional Renaissance struggle between passion and reason/spirit; the contrast is between the ideal potentialities of the soul for order and harmony and its too often brutal actualities. Like Plato, Aristotle, More, and Erasmus, Shakespeare establishes the *modus operandi* of his governor, Prospero, upon emotional, moral, and intellectual discipline and wisdom since Prospero is to be responsible for the education of his subjects and his commonwealth. As in the *Oedipus Rex*, *The Tempest’s* action is focused upon the end of the drama, the final climactic episode in the life of the protagonist, unifying past and present and making them become as one. As Prospero’s past unfolds through the mediatrix of Miranda, his entire life is seen as a quest for his true nature. Shakespeare’s belief appears to be that knowledge generates itself out of the perpetual fall of man, a theme consonant with the classical and Christian variations on the paradox of the fortunate fall. For Shakespeare, the truly mature man is one who has accepted the full moral responsibility.
for his fallible humanity, has suffered and grown wise, accepting the comic and tragic realities of life. The sentiments of the Prospero who is borne to the island derive from the assumption that human nature and organized society are intrinsically evil, despite the pretenses of virtue which may characterize mankind and society.

Prospero's final revelation is that although all persons can be neither completely nor partially redeemed because of their freely choosing to resist positive reformation (Caliban and Antonio), some people can be improved; and that such meaningful and durable principles as love can be re-affirmed to effect, one hopes, the rejuvenation of social and political institutions.14

In this final Shakespearean drama of what men do and should do, Miranda is a central clue to interpreting Prospero's history from past to present. She is the center of the shifting visions of possible earthly felicity, a felicity lost in the treacherous world of Milan but re-discovered on the island. Miranda's human innocence touches Prospero at a level deeper than thought; through her, Prospero indeed prospers as he feels and sees the great power of love.

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Notes

1Northrop Frye may be cited as typical of those critics who argue against any religious interpretation of The Tempest; see his comments, for example, in A Natural Perspective: the Development of Shakespearean Comedy and Romance (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1965). E. E. Stoll is representative of those who oppose any allegorical or symbolical interpretations; see his essay, "The Tempest," PMLA, 47 (1932), 699-726.

1I have borrowed this useful terminology from Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (New York: Prentice Hall, 1945), p. 32; in which the outline for this "grammar" of action is described as poiemata (act), pathemata (state), and mathemata (perception). On the theme of transformation see the provocative comments by Reuben Brower, "The Mirror Analogy: The Tempest," The Fields of Light: An Experiment in Critical Reading (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1951).

3Kenneth Muir, in Last Periods of Shakespeare, Racine and Ibsen (Detroit: Wayne State Univ. Press, 1961), also finds The Tempest to be a re-enactment of the process of forgiveness. Also stimulating is Harry Berger, Jr., "Miraculous


5 All references are to The Tempest, ed. Frank Kermode, 6th rev. ed., New Arden Shakespeare (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1961). Professor Kermode's perceptive introductory comments are seminal for understanding many central issues in the play.

6 See Gonzalo's description in II.i.1ff. Gonzalo's account of the island is of a classical Eden, a Golden Age, much like Matilda's observations to Dante in the Purgatorio: "Qui fu innocente l' umana radice; qui primavera e sempre . . ." (XXVIII, 142-143). Prospero's reply to Miranda in act five, "'Tis new to thee" (184), and his epilogue to the play, is a recognition of Eden in its Christian meanings—a post-lapsarian state which recognizes the primacy of love and the awareness of evil. For a reading of Gonzalo's description, see the comments by Harry Levin, The Myth of the Golden Age in the Renaissance (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1969), pp. 125 ff.


9 We need remind ourselves that Miranda constantly equates the literal with a kind of ideal spirit for this comment is made when she is confronted by Caliban and Antonio: Miranda is possible, therefore, only in the Edenic world of the island, for only there can her innocence of nature and nurture be one.
On this point Professor Kermode writes, "Prospero, like Adam, fell from his kingdom by an inordinate thirst for knowledge" but "as a scholar he repairs his loss of Eden; as a man he learns to temper his passions" (I, xlviii).


A full treatment of this topic may be found in Herbert Weisinger, *Tragedy and the Paradox of the Fortunate Fall* (East Lansing: Michigan State College Press, 1953).

See, for example, Rose A. Zimbardo, "Form and Disorder in *The Tempest*," *SQ*, 14 (Winter 1963), 49-56: Prospero's art "can order what is amenable to order, but it can only affect temporarily that which is fundamentally chaotic" (55).