Nomination of Richard Helms to be Ambassador to Iran and CIA International and Domestic Activities. Hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 5 and 7, May 21, 1973. iii, 109 pp. The text has been placed on-line in the Virtual Vietnam Archive of the Vietnam Project, at Texas Tech University, in two sections: front matter and pp. 1-51 and pp. 52-109.
Nomination of William E. Colby. Hearings of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, July 2, 20, 25, 1973, with William Colby
(nominee for Director of Central Intelligence), Robert F. Drinan (antiwar Catholic priest and member
of the U.S. House of Representatives), Samuel A. Adams (former CIA analyst), Paul Sakwa (former
CIA officer), David S. Harrington, and Kenneth B.
Osborn (formerly in U.S. Army Intelligence). Considerable discussion of the
Phoenix Program. iii + 186 pp. The text has been placed on-line in
the Virtual Vietnam Archive
of the Vietnam Project, at Texas Tech University, in two sections:
matter and pp. 1-91 (Colby, Drinan, Adams, Sakwa), and
pp. 92-186 (Sakwa, Harrington,
Y 4.Ar 5/3:C 67/3
U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: The Performance
of the Intelligence Community, part 2.
Hearings before the Select Committee on Intelligence [the "Pike Committee"], U.S. House
of Representatives, Ninety-fourth Congress, First Session.
Includes (pp. 683-719, 881-893) testimony of September 18, 1975, by
former CIA analyst Samuel Adams, that the military
falsified estimates of enemy troop strength during the war. (For background on this see
The Order of Battle Dispute.)
Y 4.In 8/18:In 8/pt. 2
U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: The Performance of the Intelligence Community, part 5. Testimony by various intelligence officers in regard to Adams' charges, December 3, 1975. This starts off with Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, engaged in flagrant falsehoods, distorting Adams' charges to make them easier to refute. Graham says:
The validity of Mr. Adams' attack on the reputations of individuals in the CIA, in military intelligence, and of other military and diplomatic leaders rests ultimately on the proposition that his figures were correct and everyone else's figures were "phony." The fact is that the opposite is true. Mr. Adams was quite wrong at the time and is quite wrong now in insisting that there were 600,000 armed VC/NVA troops available to the enemy at the time of the Tet Offensive... Adams has contended in a Harper's magazine article and before this committee that... our forces were surprised at Tet; that 10,000 Americans were killed..." (p. 1652)
The reality is that Adams had never claimed that the number of
armed VC/NVA troops was 600,000, or even close to 600,000.
Adams had not rejected everyone else's figures as phony, even when
they were different from his own; note in particular his willingness
to accept the figures of Col. Hawkins, head of the Order of Battle
Section of Westmoreland's intelligence staff in Vietnam for most of 1967.
Adams had not told the committee that 10,000 Americans had been killed
in the Tet Offensive, and when a member of the committee had asked
him whether this had happened, Adams said it had not (part 2, p. 696).
The difference between what Graham says Adams had said and what
Adams had actually said undermines Graham's credibility when he
is talking about things that are harder to check.
Y 4.In8/18:In 8/pt. 5, pages 1651-1727, 1981-2010
Recommendations of the Final Report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence [the "Pike Committee"]. House Report No. 94-833. The recommendations were the only part of the final report that was ever formally published. The remainder of the report was leaked, published first as "The CIA Report the President Doesn't Want You to Read," The Village Voice (New York), February 16, 1976, with a follow-up "How Ford, Kissinger and the CIA Obstructed the House Probe," February 23, 1976. It was later published as a book, CIA: The Pike Report (Nottingham, England: Spokesman Books, 1977 [284 pp. Introduction by Philip Agee.]).
Final report of the
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect
to Intelligence Activities (Frank Church, Chmn.), April 26, 1976.
Book I: Foreign and Military Intelligence,
viii, 651 pp., does not have much on Vietnam.
Book II: Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans,
xvi, 396 pp. Deals with domestic intelligence.
Book III: Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence
Activities and the Rights of Americans. v, 989 pp.
Book IV: Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Foreign and Military
Intelligence. vi, 175 pp.
Book V: The Investigation of the Assassination of President John
F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies. v, 106 pp.
Book VI: Supplementary Reports on Intelligence Activities. vi, 378 pp.
94-2:S.rp.755/bk.1-6 (13133-3 through 13133-8 in Clemson Serial Set)
Vietnamese Commandos. Hearing before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, June 19, 1996. iii, 36
text has been placed on-line in the
Virtual Vietnam Archive
of the Vietnam Project, at Texas Tech University.
Y 4.In 8/19:S.HRG.104-820
Private Sector Publications: Special Operations and Intelligence
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Copyright © 1999, 2001, 2005, 2006, 2013, Edwin E. Moise. This document may be reproduced only if this copyright notice is reproduced with it. Revised May 6, 2013.