Vietnam War Bibliography:

The Pentagon Papers

One of the most important sources of information about the war is the collection of documents, with analysis, commonly known as "The Pentagon Papers." Originally compiled inside the Defense Department between 1967 and 1969, it was a long and detailed history of U.S. policy toward Vietnam from 1945 to about March of 1968, plus about 4,000 pages of the actual texts of some of the most important documents dealing with Vietnam, up through 1963, found in Defense Department files. Substantial portions were leaked to the press in 1971; the complete text was declassified and released to the public in 2011.

Complete text of the Pentagon Papers, placed online by the National Archives, June 13, 2011.

For accounts of way the Pentagon Papers were leaked in 1971, and of the government's efforts to block publication, see The Pentagon Papers Case.

Various partial versions of the Pentagon Papers were published at various dates from 1971 onward:

U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967: A Study Prepared by The Department of Defense. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971. 12 volumes. The pages of this edition are photographic reproductions of pages from the original classified study. It is more nearly complete than any other of the editions published before 2011, but there are sporadic omissions from many of the volumes, and huge omissions from the last of the twelve, which would have expanded to several volumes if this material had been printed.
Y 4.Ar5/2:V67/3/945-67

A substantial portion of this edition has been placed on-line in the Virtual Vietnam Archive of the Vietnam Project, at Texas Tech University. It is hard to tell how much, the way it has been broken up into chunks, some of them relatively large, many as small as one or two pages. In some cases the scanning was very disorganized, with pages out of order and the same page scanned several times. In some cases, pages from rather widely separated sections of the Pentagon Papers have been combined together in one scanning job. I have given, below, a partial Table of Contents for the twelve volumes, more detailed for some volumes than for others. I have given links to some of the sections that have been placed online, but you should not treat this list as complete. There is more online at Texas Tech than I have been able to indicate here.

Book 1
  I. Vietnam and the U.S., 1940-1950
     A. U.S. Policy, 1940-50 (pp. A-1 to A-62)
         Foreword and map (pp. i, ii)
         Summary (pp. A-1 to A-8)
         1. Indochina in U.S. Wartime Policy, 1941-1945 (pp. A-9 to A-26)
           a. Roosevelt's Trusteeship Concept
           b. Truman and the Occupation of Indochina, 1945
         2. U.S. Neutrality in the Franco-Viet Minh War, 1946-1949 (pp. A-27 to A-50)
     B. The Character and Power of the Viet Minh (pp. B-1 to B-69)
         Summary (pp. B-1 to B-7)
         1. Origins of the Viet Minh
           Contents (p. B-8)
           a. Pre-World War II Vietnamese Political Movements (pp. B-9 to B-17)
           b. World War II and the Viet Minh (pp. B-18 to B-32)
         2. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (pp. B-33 to B-69)
     C. Ho Chi Minh: Asian Tito? (pp. C-1 to C-104)
         Summary (pp. C-1 to C-7)
         1. Versions of the "Asian Tito" Hypothesis (pp. C-8 to C-30)
         2. A Political Biography of Ho Chi Minh, 1890-1950 (pp. C-31 to C-53)
         3. Ho Chi Minh's Communications with the U.S., 1945-1946 (pp. C-57 to C-104)
  II. U.S. Involvement in the Franco-Viet Minh War, 1950-1954
     A. U.S., France and Vietnamese Nationalism
         Summary (pp. A-1 to A-3)
         Tab 1: United States Policy and the Bao Dai Regime (pp. A-4 to A-30)
           Contents (p. A-4)
           1. The Bao Dai Solution (pp. A-5 to A-10)
           2. U.S. Policy towards Bao Dai (pp. A-11 to A-30)
         Tab 2: Leverage: France had More than the United States
           Contents (p. A-34)
           1. American Leverage on France (pp. A-35 to A-38)
           2. French Leverage on the United States (pp. A-38 to A-42)
           Footnotes (p. A-43)
         Tab 3: Perceptions of the Communist Threat to Southeast Asia and to Basic U.S. Interests
           Contents (p. A-44)
           Sections 1-7 [includes discussion of the domino theory] (pp. A-45 to A-52)
           Footnotes (p. A-53)
     B. Toward a Negotiated Settlement (pp. B-1 to B-31)
         Summary (pp. B-1 to B-3)
         Tab 1: The Interagency Debate over U.S. Intervention in Indochina (pp. B-4 to B-13)
         Tab 2: The Attempt to Organize "United Action" (pp. B-16 to B-31)
           5. Reappraisal of Domino Theory After Dien Bien Phu (pp. B-30 to B-31)
  III. The Geneva Accords
     A. U.S. Military Planning and Diplomatic Maneuver
               1. U.S. Pre-Conference Maneuvers, January-April 1954 (pp. A-3 to A-12)
               2. U.S. and French on United Action, May-Mid June 1954 (pp. A-16 to A-26)
     B. Role and Obligations of State of Vietnam
               1. GVN Status and Negotiating Position at Geneva (pp. B-3 to B-16)
     C. Viet Minh Position and Sino-Soviet Strategy
               Summary (pp. C-1 to C-2)
               1. DRV Negotiating Position (pp. C-3 to C-13)
               2. Sino-Soviet Objectives and Strategy (pp. C-16 to C-26)
     D. The Intent of the Geneva Accords
               Summary (pp. D-1 to D-3)
               1. The Outcome for the Communists (pp. D-5 to D-10)
  IV. Evolution of the War
     A. U.S. MAP for Diem: The Eisenhower Commitments, 1954-1960
         1. NATO and SEATO: A Comparison (51 pp.; pp. 26-36 not printed)
         2. Aid for France in Indochina, 1950-1954 (iv, 24 pp.)
         3. The U.S. and France's Withdrawal from Vietnam, 1954-1956 (xviii, 40 pp.) Part of this (many pages were missed in the scanning) is online.

Book 2
         4: US Training of the Vietnamese National Army, 1954-1959
               Summary (pp. 1.1 to 5.1)
               Principal Personalities, 1954-1960 (p. iii)
               Chronology [1948-62] (46 pp.)
               Table of Contents (pp. i-ii)
               US Training of the Vietnamese National Army, 1954-1959 (pp. 1-31)
               Footnotes (pp. 32-41 not printed)
               Bibliography (pp. 42-? not printed)
         5. Origins of the Insurgency, 1954-1960
               Foreword (one page, unpaginated)
               Summary (pp. 1-37)
               Tab 1: Failure of the Geneva Settlement
                  Table of Contents and Outline (pp. i-ii)
                  Table: Major Provisions of the Geneva Accords (p. iii, not printed)
                  A. Introduction: The Flawed Peace (p. 1-2)
                  B. The Partition of Vietnam (pp. 2-8)
                  C. Refugees: Disruption of Vietnam's Society (pp. 8-18)
                  D. Arming of the North and the South (pp. 18-31)
                  E. The Situation in 1956 (pp. 31-33)
               Tab 2: Rebellion Against My-Diem
                  A. Diem's Political Legacy: Violence and Anti-Colonialism (pp. 1-10) (includes sects)
                  B. Ngo Dinh Diem: Basis of Power (pp. 10-18)
                  C. Conflict with the Armed Sects (pp. 18-21)
                  D. Rural Pacification (pp. 21-31)
                  E. Urban Political Alienation (pp.21-42) (includes the Caravelle Manifesto, with list of signers)
                  F. Tensions with the Armed Forces (pp. 42-45)
                  G. The Viet Cong (pp. 45-71)
               Tab 3: Hanoi and the Insurgency in South Vietnam
                  A. Character of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (pp. 1-8)
                  B. The DRV's Domestic Objectives (pp. 9-20)
                  C. Foreign Policy Objectives (pp. 20-32)
                  D. Links with the Viet Cong (pp. 32-44)
                  E. DRV Strategy: Objectives and Timing (pp. 45-71)
               Tab 4: U.S. Perceptions of the Insurgency  
                  Table of Contents and Outline (p. i) pp. i-ii, 1-42;  
                  Principal Personalities, 1954-1960 (p. ii) pp. i-ii, 1-42;  
                  A. U.S. Intelligence, 1954-1959 (pp. 1-26) pp. i-ii, 1-42;  
                  B. U.S. Policy and Programs, 1954-1960 (pp. 26-42) pp. i-ii, 1-42;  
                  C. Recognition of Crisis, 1960   pp. 43-77;   pp. 78-99.
     B. Counterinsurgency: The Kennedy Commitments, 1961-1963
         1. The Kennedy Commitments and Programs, 1961
                Summary and Analysis (pp. i-vi) (first part of a long file)
               Chronology (pp. 1-22)

              Table of Contents
              Chapter i (untitled)
              Chapter ii: The Counterinsurgency Plan
              Chapter iii: The Spring Decisions - I
              Chapter iv: From May to September
              Chapter v: The Fall Decisions - I
              Chapter vi: The Fall Decisions - II

Table of Contents
pp. 1-8
pp. 9-18
pp. 19-21
and pp. 21-47 and pp. 48-51
pp. 52-75

pp. 76-99 and pp. 100-113
pp. 114-125
and pp. 126-148

Book 3
         2. Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961-1963
                Summary and Analysis (pp. i-v), Chronology (p. vi) (second part of a long file)
                Table of Contents (pp. a-b) and pp. 1-22
                pp. 22-36
         3. The Advisory Build-Up, 1961-67
                Summary and Analysis (pp. i-x) (third part of a long file)
                pp. i-iii, 1-20
                pp. 21-57
                pp. 57-82
                pp. 81-106
                pp. 107-133
         4. Phased Withdrawal of U.S. Forces in Vietnam, 1962-64
                Summary (pp. i-vii) (fourth part of a long file)
                p. f of Chronology; p. g (Table of Contents); pp. 1-40
         5. The Overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, May-Nov. 1963
                Summary and Analysis (pp. i-viii) (last part of a long file)
     C. Direct Action: The Johnson Commitments, 1964-1968
         1. U.S. Programs in South Vietnam, November 1963-April 1965: NSAM 273 - NSAM 288 - Honolulu
               Summary and Analysis (pp. i-vii)
               Chronology (pp. a-2 to a-16)
               I. NSAM 273
                   Table of Contents and Outline (p. a-1) and pp. 1-35
                   pp. 36-55
               II. NSAM-288 - Tonkin Gulf (pp. 56-90)
               III. From Tonkin to NSAM-328 (pp. 90-105);   (pp. 106-109)
               IV. NSAM-328 (pp. 109-120)
         2. Military Pressures Against NVN
                a. February - June 1964.
                   Table of Contents (pp. iii-vii); pp. viii, xxvii of the Chronology; pp. 1-20, 22-40

Book 4
                b. July - October 1964.
                   Tab A: Draft Resolution on Southeast Asia, 25 May 1964. 6 pp.
                   Tab B: Secretary McNamara's Prepared Testimony, 20 February 1968 (Tonkin Gulf).
                c. November - December 1964.
                   Summary and Analysis (pp. i-vii); p. viii of the Chronology
         3. ROLLING THUNDER Program Begins: January-June 1965
                Summary and Analysis (pp. i-viii)
                Table of Contents (pp. a-b) and pp. 1-46
                pp. 47-80
                pp. 81-129
                pp. 130-149 (140-149 is endnotes)
         4. Marine Combat Units Go to Da Nang, March 1965   pp. iii-vi, 1-25, i-iv (pages out of order)
               Summary (pp. i-iii)
               Table of Contents and Outline (pp. iv-vi)
               Chronology (pp. viii-xvi)
               Marine Combat Units Go to Da Nang, March 1965 (pp. 1-22)
               Footnotes (pp. 23-25)
         5. Phase I in the Build-up of U.S. Forces, The Debate, March-July 1965.
                Summary and Analysis (pp. 1-10)
               Chronology of Build-up Activity (pp. 11-32)
                pp. 33-74
                pp. 75-112
                pp. 113-135

Book 5
         6. U.S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments: 1965-1967
               Chronology [June 1965 - April 1968] (pp. i-xviii)
               a. Volume I: Phase II, Program 3, Program 4 (ii, 127 pp.)
                   tables of contents, pp. 1-28
                   pp. 29-51 (includes endnotes)
                   pp. 52-100
                   pp. 101-127
               b. Volume II: Program 5 (ii, 235 pp.)
                   pp. 58-104
                   pp. 105-145
                   pp. 147-197 (p. 146 missing)
                   pp. 198-235 (pp. 228-235 are endnotes to pp. 146-227)
               c. Volume III: Program 6 (i, 93 pp.)

Book 6
         7. Air War in the North: 1965-1968
               a. Volume I
                   Chronology (pp. 1-26) (covers July 1965 to March 1968)
                   Table of Contents
                   I. July 1965 to the Year-End Bombing Pause (pp. 1-57)
                   II. The POL Debate--November 1965 - June 1966 (pp. 63-127)
                   III. McNamara's Disenchantment--JUly-December 1966 (pp. 138-180)
               b. Volume II
                   Table of Contents (pp. i-ii)
                   IV. The Attempt to De-escalate--January-July 1967 (pp. 1-80)
                   V. The Long Road to De-escalation--August-December 1967 (pp. 90-136)
                   VI. The Corner is Turned--January-March 1968 (pp. 141-204)
         8. Re-emphasis on Pacification: 1965-1967
                Summary (pp. i-viii)
                Table of Contents (p. ix), pp. 2-47 [p. 1 missing]
                pp. 48-97
                pp. 98-118
                pp. 119-137

Book 7
         9. U.S.-GVN Relations
           I. 1964 - June 1965
               Summary and Analysis (pp. i-xviii)
               Contents (p. xix)
               I. Aftermath of the Diem Coup, First Half of 1964 (pp. 1-30) pp. 1-5, 8-18, 21-30
               II. Ambassador Taylor's First Seven Months: Planning for "Bomb North" amid Turbulence in the South (pp. 31-64)
                     pp. 31-38, 41-46, 49-53; pp. 54-64
               III. The US Enters the War: Flaming Dart to the Steady Influx of US Forces, June 1965 (pp. 65-75)
           [Printing error, at least in my copy--about 30 pages that duplicate pages found elsewhere]
           II. June 1965 - Fall 1967 pp. i, xviii-xix, 1-45;   pp. 46-61
               Summary and Analysis (pp. i-vii)
               Chronology (pp. viii-xvii)
               Contents (p. xviii-xix)
               I. The Ky Government's Early Months: The Coup to the Embrace at Honolulu, February 1966 (pp. 1-10)
               II. A Rebellion, A Constituent Assembly, and the Hardships of Negotiating with a "Weak" Government (pp. 11-33)
               III. A Seven Nation Conference, Legitimate Government, and High Hopes for the Future, Oct 1966 - Sep 1967 (pp. 34-61)
         10: Statistical Survey of the War, North and South: 1965-1967
  V. Justification of the War
     A. Public Statements
       Foreword
         A. Truman Administration
           Summary (page A)
         B. Eisenhower Administration
           Summary (page B) and Contents (page B-1)
         C. Kennedy Administration
           Summary (page C) and Contents (page C-1)
                  Excerpt from President Kennedy's News Conference, February 14, 1962, pp. C-16 to C-18
         D. Johnson Administration
           Foreword (page i)
           1. 1964
             Summary (page D)
           2. 1965
             Summary (p. D-21), Contents (p. D-22)
           3. 1966
             Summary (p. D-60)
           4. 1967
             Summary (p. D-94)
     B. Internal Documents
         1. The Roosevelt Administration

Book 8
         2. The Truman Administration
               Book I: 1945-1949 (pp. a, i-xxvi, 1-272)
                 Stanton (Far Eastern Bureau) to Dunn, re: Memorandum for the President Regarding Indochina, April 21, 1945 (pp. 9-17).
                 Dunn's objections, and additional documents, April 23- , 1945 (pp. 18-25).
                 Memos by George Abbott, U.S. consul in Saigon (pp. 154-189). Memos of Feb 12, 1949 are on
                    pp. 158-189. Others dated March 31, May 5.
                 Butterworth (State Department) 289 to Bruce (Paris), 6 June 1949 (pp. 200-216) (an unenthusiastic
                    evaluation of the agreement between the French and Bao Dai)
               Book II: 1950-1952 (pp. a, i-xxvi, 273-540)
                 Acheson 1363 to Paris, 29 March 1950 (pp. 301-304) (U.S. wants France to make a clearer
                    statement of its intentions regarding Vietnamese nationalism)
                 Griffin to Acheson, 4 May 1950, "Conference on Indo-China - May 2, 1950" (pp. 322-326)
                 K.T. Young, Memorandum for the Record, Informal State-Defense Meeting on Indochina, 17 October 1950 (pp. 373-387)
                 Saigon 763 to Secretary of State, 4 November 1950 (pp. 405-410) (General Brink, head
                    of MAAG, reports changes in French military policy)

Book 9
         3. The Eisenhower Administration
               Book I: 1953 (pp. i-liv, 1-211)
               Book II: 1954 - The Geneva Accords (pp. viii-xxx, 212-675)
                  CJCS Radford memo to President Eisenhower, 24 March 1954, on Radford's discussions with
                     French General Paul Ely, and Paris 3710 to Dulles, April 4, 1954 (French request U.S. airstrikes to save
                     Dien Bien Phu, detail Chinese support for the Viet Minh), pp. 288-91, 296-97
                  "Consequences Within Indochina of the Fall of Dien Bien Phu," National Intelligence Estimate 63-54,
                     approved 28 April 1954, published 30 April 1954, pp. 400-405
                  Debriefing of Major General Thomas J.H. Trapnell, former Chief of MAAG, Indochina, 3 May 1954. pp. 406-420
                  Draft instructions for the U.S. representative in Geneva, May 10, 1954, pp. 443-45
                  Dulles TOSEC 157 to Geneva, May 12, 1954, instructions for the U.S. representative in Geneva, pp. 457-59
                  Dulles 4272 to Paris, May 26, 1954, urging France to grant Vietnamese independence, pp. 484-86
                  Charles Sullivan (in Geneva) to Admiral Davis, 28 May 1954, reporting that the conference is
                     clearly heading toward and unacceptable agreement, pp. 498-99
                  Dulles TEDUL 169 to Geneva, 7 June 1954, saying that the United States "should seek to avoid formal
                     identification with open partition or the creation of two states where one now exists." pp. 533-34
                  Geneva to Secretaty of State, 19 July 1954. Topping [probably Seymour Topping] recently interviewed
                     Huang Hua of the PRC, who was very agitated about the prospect of US bases in Indochina, or an
                     anti-Communist pact in Southeast Asia, and seemed to believe Smith wanted to prevent a settlement. p. 663
                  Geneva to Secretaty of State, 19 July 1954. Smith is very happy with the way the ICC is shaping up,
                     with Poland, India, and either Canada or Belgium, each having a veto. p. 664
                  Geneva to Secretary of State, 19 July 1954. Smith says the US can under no circumstances endorse
                     the final declaration of the Geneva Conference. pp. 665-66
                  Dulles to Geneva, 19 July 1954. Discusses the US declaration. pp. 667-68
                  Geneva to Secretary of State, 19 July 1954. Proposal by the State of Vietnam. pp. 669-70

Book 10
               Book III: Geneva Accords - 15 March 1956 (pp. xxi-xlv, 676-1056)
                  Secretary of State Dulles 4438 to Saigon, April 9, 1955, supporting Ngo Dinh Diem, pp. 907-909
                  Paris 4746 to State, April 30, 1955, Bao Dai expresses great hostility to Ngo Dinh Diem, pp. 948-954
                  Paris SECTO 8 to Secretary of State, May 8, 1955, on French policy, pp. 959-966
                  Saigon 5074 to Secretary of State, May 8, 1955, on French hostility to Ngo Dinh Diem, pp. 967-970
               Book IV: 1956 French Withdrawal - 1960 (pp. xlv-liv, 1057-1364)
                  Robert D. Murphy to Secretary of State, May 1, 1956, on TERM, pp. 1057-1059
                  NSC 5612/1, "U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia," 5 September 1956, pp. 1081-1095
                  NSC 5809, "U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia," 2 April 1958, pp. 1113-1133
                  Operations Coordinating Board "Report on Southeast Asia (NSC 5809), January 7, 1959, pp. 1156-1182.
                    Includes as annexes a CIA report "Sino-Soviet Bloc Activities in Mainland Southeast Asia,"
                    December 18, 1958, and a financial annex giving detailed figures on U.S. aid.
                  Joint Chiefs of Staff, "U.S. Policy in the Far East," 14 July 1959 (pp. 1211-1235)
                  Saigon 278 to State, "Special Report on Current Internal Security Situation," 7 March 1960 (pp. 1254-1275)
                  NSC 6012, "U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia," 25 July 1960, pp. 1281-1296
                  Saigon 624 to Department of State, 16 September 1960 (pp. 1311-1316)
                  State 658 to Saigon (joint State-DOD message), 19 October 1960, pp. 1325-26
                  Saigon 276 to State, January 4, 1961, "Counter Insurgency Plan for South Vietnam," pp. 1357-59

Book 11
         4. The Kennedy Administration
               Book I: January thru December 1961 (pp. a, i-xxii, 1-427)
                  Contents and Chronological List of Documents
                  Memorandum of Conversation, "Laos," April 29, 1961. pp. 62-66. High civilian officials and the Joint Chiefs
                     discuss where in Southeast Asia is the appropriate place for the United States to fight Communist
                     expansion. Interesting comments on the likelihood of war with China.
                  Edward Lansdale, "A Program of Action to Prevent Communist Domination of South Vietnam,"
                     draft, 6 May 1961, with cover letter, May 8, 1961, pp. 69, 138-154
                  "Joint Action Program Proposed by the Viet Nam - United States Special Financial Group" (the "Staley Report").
                     Report undated; cover letters by Col. Edwin F. Black July 25, and William P. Bundy July 26, 1961.
                     pp. 178-203 (cover letters and pp. 1-18 of document text)
                     pp. 204-226 (remainder of document text)
                  General Lionel C. McGarr, Aide Memoire for President Diem, "Review of Military Situation and Recommendations
                     for Continued Improvement," approximately 2 August 1961, pp. 227-38
                  Prospects for North and South Vietnam," NIE 14.3/53-61, 15 August 1961 (summary), pp. 245-46
                  Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense, "Concept of Use of SEATO Forces in South Vietnam,"
                     JCSM 716-61, 9 October 1961, pp. 297-311
                  "Probable Communist Reactions to Certain SEATO Undertakings in South Vietnam," SNIE 10-3-61,
                     10 October 1961, pp. 313-321
                  Taylor to Kennedy, 1 November 1961, pp. 331-36
                  Memorandum of 13 November 1961, and cover letter from Robert G.K. Thompson to Ngo Dinh Diem
                     dated 11 November [yes, that looks inconsistent], pp. 345-358, in which Thompson proposed
                     "strategic hamlets" for the Mekong Delta.
                  Joint Staff Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "South Vietnam," 19 November 1961, pp. 368-99

Book 12
               Book II: January 1962 thru October 1963 (pp. i-xxii, 428-605)
                  Contents and Chronological List of Documents
                  Talking Paper for the Chairman, JCS, for meeting with the President of the United States 9 January 1962,
                     "Current US Military Actions in South Vietnam," pp. 428-39
                  Joint Chiefs of Staff, "The Strategic Importance of the Southeast Asia Mainland"
                     (JCSM 33-62), 13 January 1962, pp. 447-54 (has a strong statement of the domino theory)
                  "Progress Report on South Vietnam," INR Research Memorandum RFE-27, June 18, 1962, pp. 469-480
                  "The Situation and Short-Term Prospects in South Vietnam" INR Research Memorandum RFE-59, December 3, 1962
                     Cover letter, Hilsman to Rusk, December 3, 1962 (pp. 487-89)
                     Text (pp. 490-521)
                  Special National Intelligence Estimate 53-2-63, "The Situation in South Vietnam," 10 July 1963. pp. 529-535
                  INR Research Memorandum RFE-90, 22 October 1963, "Statistics on the War Effort in South Vietnam
                      Show Unfavorable Trends," pp. 579-89
  VI. Settlement of the Conflict
     A. Negotiations, 1965-67: The Public Record (pp. i, 1-78)
     B. Negotiations, 1965-67: Announced Position Statements (pp. i-iii, 1-271)
       1. U.S. Position Statements (pp. 1-97)
       2. NVN Position Statements (pp. 98-187)
                  DRV White Paper, US Aggression and Intervention in Vietnam," July 10, 1965 (excerpts). pp. 146-151
       3. NFLSV Position Statements (pp. 188-234)
       4. Addenda (pp. 235-271)
     C. Histories of Contacts (This material not printed in the GPO edition, but see below)

The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam. Boston: Beacon Press, 1971, 1972. 5 vols. This is four volumes of material from the original study, plus one volume of commentary and index. It is the portion made public by U.S. Senator Gravel, and is often called the "Senator Gravel Edition." Senator Gravel was in a great hurry when selecting material for this edition, and some of his choices were rather haphazard. However, this edition contains the complete texts of a number of crucial documents from the period Johnson was president, which were omitted from the version published by the U.S. government.

The Pentagon Papers. New York: Bantam Books, 1971. 677 pp. This is the version that was published in June and July 1971 by The New York Times. It consists mostly of documents from the Defense Department original. However, the historical summary in this version does not come from the historical summary in the Defense Department original. The New York Times needed something much shorter than the original, and rather than take bits and pieces of the original, the Times had its own people write a completely new historical summary. A portion of this has been placed on-line in the Virtual Vietnam Archive of the Vietnam Project at Texas Tech University. pp. 1-26 (pages out of order, and most pages scanned twice).

George C. Herring, ed., Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1983. xl, 873 pp. This contains the sections of the Defense Department study that dealt with efforts to negotiate a settlement of the war. This material was not included in any of the editions published during the war, because people were afraid publicity would interfere with the negotiations. The endnotes on pp. 827-856 of this volume are by Herring; they are not the endnotes that were part of the original classified text.

George C. Herring, ed., The Pentagon Papers: Abridged Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993. xxii, 228 pp.

The Pentagon Papers: Summaries of Documents Published in the American Press. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 1971. The text has been placed on-line in the Virtual Vietnam Archive of the Vietnam Project, at Texas Tech University, in two parts: Front matter and pp. 1–48 (summaries of articles published in the New York Times), and pp. 49–92 (more summaries of articles published in the New York Times, and summaries of articles published in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the Boston Globe, and the Chicago Sun-Times).

 

Go to books about The Pentagon Papers Case

Return to Table of Contents

Next section: Defense Department

Except for the section on the Senator Gravel edition, this document is copyright © 1996, 1997, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, Edwin E. Moise, and may be reproduced only by permission. Revised June 14, 2011.