Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 552 pp. Moyar endorses Ngo Dinh Diem's leadership, and the American decision to go to war in Vietnam. He criticizes the Americans who turned against Diem, and/or turned against the war. I have looked at only a few pages of this book. While Moyar should be commended for his use of Vietnamese sources, in other respects his research seems to have been careless.

One problem is factual errors. I noticed these especially in the section dealing with the Tonkin Gulf incidents of 1964. Almost everyone who writes about Tonkin Gulf makes some errors--I have done so myself--but the number of problems in these pages seems excessive:

Another problem with this book is some rather strange logic in Moyar's argument that the United States did not really have cause to fear that China would intervene in the war if the United States went too far against North Vietnam. He takes what looks to me like evidence China was willing to fight the United States, and interprets it as evidence China was not willing to fight.

 

Opinions expressed in this page are my own. They could not very well be the opinions of Clemson University, since Clemson University does not have opinions on this subject.
Edwin E. Moïse 

Revised October 3, 2013.